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Introduction

“For I have long observed that, twenty miles from London, nobody understands hints,
initial letters, or town facts and passages; and in a few years not even those who live in London”
(Nichols 755). So claimed Jonathan Swift about The Dunciad, Alexander Pope’s mock-epic of
1728 that was dedicated to Swift. Swift’s claim suggests that Pope’s satire was utterly local,
contingent upon and perhaps even defined by Pope’s relationship with both the place and era he
lived in and wrote about. If we contrast Swift’s remark to J.A. Cuddon’s words on the satiric
author, “The satirist is thus a kind of self-appointed guardian of standard, ideals, and truth; of
moral as well as aesthetic values. He is a man who takes it upon himself to correct, censure, and
ridicule the follies and vices of society” (780). If the satire is of a moral kind and works towards
unmasking truth, this begs the question as to whether satire relates to all civilizations across all
ages, for truths and morals must surely hold steadfast across all societies to which they apply.
Cuddon unconsciously appears to imply divergent standards for satire, and Swift’s and his
observations about satire conflict and remain unsolved. This antinomy—the conclusion that a
satirical text is poorly understood outside of its origin versus the worldwide scope of the satirical
text and its message—is the subject of debate.

Other authors and commentators on satire, perhaps less astute than Swift in agonizing
over the inherent locality of satire, have argued the absence of effective satire during certain
times. Mikhail Bakhtin claimed that there had been no satirist since the Middle Ages, Swift
included, to truly embrace the universal spirit of the carnival (Rabelais and His Other World 12).
Bakhtin does, however, recognize what he terms the “heritage of the culture” (Rabelais 18) in
which the carnivalesque and satire reside. The imagery and signs of the carnival are of a
“peculiar type” (Rabelais 18) and contain certain characteristics that are congenital with the
satire. Linda Hutcheon is also attuned to the relationship between a satirical text and the
circumstances out of which it was born, “the creator…may well be dead…but the creator’s
position—a position of discursive authority—remains” (85). But Swift’s familiarity to the issue
of locality in satire is more proximate than either Bakhtin or Hutcheon because of his own
association with the genre. If satire is merely local, then its applicability to non-contemporary
readers is diminished; it can no longer instruct morals or discover truths in the way Cuddon
believes it potentially can. This led Walter Benjamin to conclude that “satire is the only
legitimate form of regional art” (260) because it “consists in the devouring of the civilization’s
adversary” (260). Satire is particular to the region and civilization it is born in.
In Book IV of Gulliver’s Travels, “A Voyage to the Country of the Houyhnhnms,” Swift
broadens the scope of his satire. Gulliver meets the savage and deformed humanoid Yahoos,
whom he spurns, before encountering an intelligent race of Houyhnhnms. Gulliver admires the
Houyhnhnms (the name means “the perfection of nature” (199) in their own language) and
follows their rejection of his human counterparts, the Yahoos. Gulliver quickly becomes
subservient to the Houyhnhnms, referring to his Houyhnhnm as “master” (199). Swift uses the
Houyhnhnms as a tool to both chastise human nature through their degrading observations of the
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differing “Degrees of Brutality” (222) amongst the Yahoos, and through their own apparent
exemplary example. Says Gulliver, “these Noble Houyhnhnms are endowed by Nature with a
general Disposition to all Virtues, and have no Conceptions or Ideas of what is Evil in a Rational
Creature, so their grand Maxim is, to cultivate Reason, and be wholly governed by it” (Swift
225). But despite Gulliver’s admiration of one species and rejection of the other, he is finally
spurned by the noble Houyhnhnms who are so governed by reason. Gulliver is exiled; the
Houyhnhnms reason through their representative assembly that they must take “offence at his
keeping a Yahoo (meaning myself) in his family more like a Houyhnhnm, than a Brute Animal”
(235). The Houyhnhnms treat Gulliver with cold, racist disdain (Turner 439). Swift’s satire now
begins its final, universal twist, a satire on the entire species, because of their pride in reason and
Gulliver’s blind consumption of their ethics. Indeed, Gulliver’s own pride in reason and the
doctrine instilled in him by the Houyhnhnm is so entrenched that after he is exiled he refers
disparagingly to humans, even treating his wife as a Yahoo, “Yet the smell of a Yahoo
continuing very offensive, I always keep my nose well stopt with Rue, Lavender, or Tobaccoleaves” (249). Furthermore, he is liable to spend several hours per day speaking with horses in
his stables.
Two objects of satires appear here, the devotion to and the emphasis placed on reason and
the treatment, or rather maltreatment, of other humans. Both the Yahoos and Houyhnhnms
possess undesirable traits, but Gulliver chooses only to acknowledge one species. Because Swift
consciously reduces the habitat to two species we can consider the satire universal; Swift shows
an awareness that a point of comparison is required to establish the unenviable traits of the
human species across the world. James Grantham Turner believes that Swift “solves a problem
endemic to satire—its locality and topicality—by broadening the scope to include entire species”
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(439). As Swift develops his satire he begins consciously to widen his horizons to include the
entirety of humanity rather than just those alive in Ireland in 1726. Swift is perhaps aware of
doing this because of the problem of locality he prescribes to Pope’s satire; consequently, his
satire is designed to be pervasive.
In the same way Swift wrote his satire, beginning in a specific locality, and then
developing it to be universal, we can read and understand satire in the same way. It appears that
satire must have a local basis; this is in some fashion unavoidable and a necessary part of the
satirical text. The author’s own morals and observations pervade throughout the text because the
inherent nature of satire depends on the author having a subject to criticize and correct. Even the
minimalism of Beckett exposes this sense of satire. But the quality of satire is not judged on any
mere local predicament; the text must develop, as Swift points out to Pope, to incorporate all
people. Bakhtin notes that the best satire, satire that pertains to the carnivalesque, embodies this
all-inclusivity, “Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and everyone
participates because its very idea embraces all the people” (Rabelais 7). But in Bakhtin’s eyes
this universal experience of satire has not been written since the folk culture of the carnival.
Two early twentieth-century texts, Max Beerbohm’s Zuleika Dobson: Or An Oxford Love Story
(1911) and Karl Kraus’ play, Die Letzten Tage der Menschheit, The Last Days of Mankind
(1919), would not be considered universal by Bakhtin primarily because of the propensity of
modern satire to focus on the negative rather than ameliorative, removing the sense of belonging
from the reader and imposing on them a private reaction (Rabelais 12).
Both texts are based in the region of their respective time period: Beerbohm’s satire
involves university society in pre-war Oxford, and Kraus’ satire consists of an Austrian
perspective on World War I. Zuleika Dobson’s story includes a young woman, the title
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character, whose arrival in Oxford sends every undergraduate into delirium because of her allure.
Beerbohm appears acutely aware of the heritage required to form his satire. His dedication, Illi
Almae Matri, to her (Zuleika’s) mother, hints at the inherent legacy and circumstance that is
necessary to satirize the romance of Oxford. Similarly, Kraus can be described as needing
World War I and its long list of evils in order to establish his satire, for without it, there is no plot
to speak of.
There are, however, elements of these two satirical texts that can be interpreted as
universal moments. Evidently, topics such as war and love are universal, but to describe each
author’s satires as universal because of the breadth of their topic is too loose a definition of
universal and fails to reach the crux of the satire. Instead, both Zuleika Dobson and The Last
Days of Mankind perhaps possess universal qualities in their satire through the texts respective
critiques of human attention to the abstract. For example, both texts, display the “herdmentality,” of the student population of Oxford in Zuleika Dobson and the Viennese public in
The Last Days of Mankind. Equivalent to Gulliver’s blind following of the Houyhnhnms, both
Kraus and Beerbohm recognize this human trait and subsequently make the herd-mentality an
object of their satire. Herd-mentality can be defined as abstract; it often appears as something
that is universal however, in reality, it is not a definitive truth. But because there is a propensity
for satirizing this particular facet of human behaviour, illustrated by its appearance in the works
of Kraus, Beerbohm, and Swift, then herd mentality and other abstractions deserve some
consideration as to whether or not they can conceivably be universal, in full or part. These
abstractions are undefined and perhaps do not necessarily work to instruct the reader, but they
remain that part of satire that can be judged universal and potentially avoid the trap of locality
and topicality.
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But does Beerbohm’s and Kraus’ satire, in addition to their potentially universal
criticisms, possess the ability to positively regenerate society and its readers? For Bakhtin, this
is modern culture’s primary fault, its negativity. It is not so much a question of perceptiveness,
“Whereas once I was blind, now I can see” (John 9:25), but more a question of whether or not
satire can instruct. To instruct, satire must contain universal qualities. But to reject the basis in
locality and topicality would be foolish; satire can be universal in its ameliorative qualities,
especially through the abstract, but the text itself must be based in locality. Satire, then,
described as “consisting of an attack by means of a manifest fiction upon discernible historical
particulars” (Rosenheim 323) permits this restatement: any universality in satire is born out of
and defined by its local base.
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Chapter I
The Necessary Locality of Satire

An Oxford Legacy
Max Beerbohm’s Zuleika Dobson sees satire opportunities thrusting out from flawed,
human conduct. Two major flaws are immediately obvious in Zuleika Dobson, the herd
mentality of the entire male undergraduate population of Oxford and the actions of the title
character herself who appears as an exaggerated literary femme fatale. Both the herd mentality
and the femme fatale appear in just the second page of the book, indicating Beerbohm’s intention
to satirize aggressively these two topics. Zuleika arrives at Oxford by train:
Ere it had yet stopped, the door of one carriage flew open, and from it, in a white
traveling-dress, in a toque a-twinkle with fine diamonds, a lithe and radiant creature
slipped nimbly down to the platform.
A cynosure indeed! A hundred eyes were fixed on her, and half as many hearts lost
to her. The throng made way for her (2)
The final sentence sets up both Zuleika as a femme fatale and the undergraduates of Oxford as
men of a herd. Only a female of such significance and power can enchant fifty people at a train
station; only will the mathematical division from paired eyes to single heart satirically mark the
fall. Meanwhile, the Oxford undergraduates throughout the novel comply as if bewitched by the
brilliance of a cynosure or guiding star. The satire, readily evident through Beerbohm’s
overblown description, simultaneously captures both the cause and effect of the femme fatale and
the herd mentality. Instead of merely mentioning the number of men Zuleika enchants,
Beerbohm conceals the number by quantifying the amount of eyes and hearts that follow

Zuleika. Henceforth with dark, comic foreshadowing, she owns both the eyes and hearts of these
men. Additionally, this scene visually describes grown men parting as if Jesus were entering
Jerusalem on Palm Sunday.
But both these themes are elements of Beerbohm’s satire that are particular to Oxford,
despite their apparent connection to Wildean or Swiftian satiric moments. Although the femme
fatale and herd mentality are evidently themes that may appear in other cultural contexts and
time periods, the femme fatale and the herd mentality that Beerbohm describes is uniquely
Oxford’s. Oxford in particular was, in Beerbohm’s eyes, susceptible to criticism due its inherent
pretentiousness, upper-class mentality and failure to recognize the limited amount of sexual
relationships. Max, the novel’s narrator, writes that the Oxford man was “careless of the sharp,
harsh, exigent realities of the outer world…these realities that may be seen by him…but they
cannot fire him. Oxford was too damp for that” (197). The Oxford men are simply one of a
flock, and a flock that was unique to Oxford. The undergraduates of the time lived in closed
quarters and Beerbohm’s first-hand experience of this (he was educated at Merton College in the
1890s) permitted him to make this observation. The smothering proximity of Oxford and the
introspective way in which its undergraduates viewed the world led Beerbohm to see Oxford as a
closed society, one that consequentially harvested a distinctive kind of student body. As a result,
while it is easy to note the herd mentality in Zuleika Dobson, it is substantially more difficult to
explain the basis of such mentality (Oxford life) without a close understanding of the time period
because of how heavily rooted the satire is entrenched in Beerbohm’s Oxford.
In a theater review from 1902, Beerbohm observed that Oxford life involves the
repressed sexuality of its males that, in turn, causes them to be so susceptible to the real-life
femme fatale (Hall xii). Beerbohm claimed that there was no successful play or novel set in
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Oxford because of the author’s fear of eliminating sex, “so the mainspring of every Oxford story
is the love of an undergraduate for Miss So-and-So” (Hall xii). However, in reality, “the instinct
of sex is dormant, and, even if it happens to be stirred in vacation, it quickly relapses in term”
(Hall xii). Thus, the basis of the satire on the femme fatale is found in other love stories about
Oxford that, despite evidence to the contrary, were readily happy to display the apparent sexual
capacities and ambitions of the Oxford undergraduate. The femme fatale, and a very particular
femme fatale narrative that is completely devoid of romantic scenes, exists in Beerbohm’s text
because it does not exist in others. In Beerbohm’s opinion Oxford had never been an effective
setting for a literary text: “Poor Oxford! Will she, I wonder, ever be made successfully the
background for a play, or for a novel?” (Hall xii). This was primarily because of the author’s
presuppositions that directed them to emphasize sex. Therefore, Beerbohm’s book aims to
satirize the femme fatale but simultaneously avoids sex because this is the circumstantial nature
of the Oxford that he knows. Thus, his satire, unlike, he believes, the other texts that romanticize
the Oxford lifestyle, holds true to circumstance.
John Dougill’s book, Oxford in English Literature: The Making, and Undoing, of ‘The
English Athens,” entitles one of its chapters, “The Delightful Lie: The Oxford Myth.” Dougill
notes that there was a tendency in Victorian Oxford to create a fabulous city with an aura of
unparalleled mystique. According to Dougill, “The ‘beautiful city’ was constructed on
foundations laid by Elizabethan and Romantic predecessors: Camden prepared the ground,
Hazlitt laid the foundations, and Arnold shaped the superstructure” (135). The Oxford ideal was
readily present before Beerbohm and the light-hearted criticism of this Oxford began under
Wilde and was later picked up by Beerbohm. Oxford’s literature now became “a mix of
supercilious wit and superior posing” (Dougill 135). Beerbohm’s satire relies on the heritage of
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literature in Oxford and the way he currently viewed the Oxford lifestyle was partially dictated
by Oxford’s literary past. Thus, following Wilde’s wit was Beerbohm’s satire and it was a
particular Oxford kind of satire based on the works of authors such as Camden, Hazlitt and
Arnold.
Consequentially, Beerbohm includes several scenes that, in another book about Oxford,
might mark sexual tension but in Zuleika Dobson instead turns out to be humorous. For
example, when Zuleika goes to see the Duke, the male protagonist, early in the story before
either has declared their love for each other (and, in the case of Zuleika, taken it away), the two
protagonists are bashful about their love. The following scene involves the second meeting
between the two and occurs when Zuleika visits the Duke in his chambers:
The lovers met. There was an interchange of ordinary greetings: from the Duke, a
comment on the weather; from Zuleika, a hope that he was well again—they had been so
sorry to lose him last night. Then came a pause. The landlady’s daughter was clearing
away the breakfast-things. Zuleika glanced comprehensively at the room, and the Duke
gazed at the hearthrug. The landlady’s daughter clattered out with her freight. They
were alone (44)
Significantly, this is the only intimate instance in the novel where both characters are in love
with each other but do not realize that their love is reciprocated. The awkward pause and
Beerbohm’s following description of the silence, including the trivial movements of the
landlady’s daughter, stereotypically depicts the uncomfortable nature of two people who lust
after each other but do not know each other well enough to communicate effectively. They are
reduced to cheap talk about the weather and their health; because of the palpable tension,
Beerbohm still gives the reader no hint as to whether their love will materialize into a
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relationship. The tension continues to build, “This dialogue led them to another hollow pause.
The Duke’s heart beat violently within him” (45), until it is unexpectedly, and not without
humor, broken by Zuleika who, despite her appearance as a femme fatale, has hitherto been only
described as loving the Duke: “Love you?’ she retorted. “You?” (49). The spell is broken and
Zuleika assumes her role as the femme fatale who cannot reciprocate love. She can only love the
man who is different from the rest and, since every man in Oxford loves her, she adores the Duke
for showing indifference to her arrival in Oxford. But the Duke does love Zuleika; he is just not
showing it because of his suppressed virility. Zuleika’s reaction is patently ridiculous and is an
example of Beerbohm’s satire on the femme fatale but still strongly indicates its basis in
circumstance, mirroring Beerbohm’s allegation that sex in Oxford was quickly made dormant.
Lawrence Danson notes that, “in the second half of the book, especially, there are scenes
which have an oddly embarrassing sexual intensity (129). But even in the first half of the book
there is tension that is broken by Zuleika’s humorous (for the reader) response. Coupled with
this sporadic sexual intensity is the character’s incompetence and, while these scenes are rooted
in humor, there is also the sense that there is a solid basis in circumstance. Beerbohm’s
experience of Oxford was that there were severe sexual uncertainties on behalf of the male
undergraduates. This experience is circumstantial because without it, the book does not pertain
to this object of satire. There can be no embarrassing sexual intensity if Beerbohm does not first
observe it in Oxford.
What effect does this basis in circumstance have on the satirical aspect of the book? John
Felstiner offers his own opinion on the effects of Oxford on Beerbohm’s longest literary work;
“Beerbohm’s particular experience there—coming of age quickly as a man and an artist, and not
bothering to finish a degree—disposed him to write neither eulogy nor criticism of the place. He
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loved Oxford, but the kind of wit the university fostered in him discouraged loving anything very
seriously” (179). Felstiner’s last line is necessary because it shows the contradiction in Zuleika
Dobson—a novel that is at once steeped in Oxford’s history and impressiveness, but similarly
liable to poke fun at this fact. What is more contentious is Felstiner’s suggestion that Zuleika is
neither a eulogy nor a criticism of Oxford. Instead, writes Felstiner, and it must be noted that he
considers the text “satiric nevertheless” (179), “Zuleika Dobson began to look more like an
attempt to preserve the nineties’ milieu and spirit than to satirize them” (179). Felstiner supports
his argument by quoting Beerbohm’s own words, “I myself had supposed it was just a fantasy”
(179). Felstiner, therefore, appears to see Zuleika Dobson primarily as a fantasy that is based in
situation, rather than a satire based in situation, because he suggests that Beerbohm, while
humorous, is nostalgically writing about Oxford rather than parodying it. In contrast, it is
possible to see satire as the primary function working in the text, regardless of Beerbohm’s
supposed intentions. Both fantasy and satire remove the author from reality, but satire’s power
lies in its close affinity to reality. This may be misread as a nostalgic fantasy, but the key
difference between satire and nostalgic fantasy (as pertaining to reality) is that satire must be
necessarily underlined by reality. This is the case regardless of the author’s intentions.
Meanwhile, a nostalgic fantasy can only be read in terms of the author’s intentions, because the
very term “nostalgic fantasy,” suggests a romantic misconception that drives the text. Satire may
well be ill conceived, but its purpose is to first highlight and then ameliorate its subjects rather
than wallow in self-aggrandizement. Zuleika Dobson, as a text viewed independent of an author,
fits this definition and can thus be defined as a satire rather than fantasy. This is not say that
authorial intent is not significant in satire. The author in satire plays a larger role than in other
genres because of satire’s circumstantial nature. But the satire prevents the text from being
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Beerbohm’s nostalgic fantasy because Beerbohm satirizes the penchant of previous Oxford
authors to regress into nostalgia.
Francis Hackett, an early reviewer of Beerbohm who wrote an introduction to the 1926
edition, offers not dissimilar sentiments from Felstiner’s. Hackett claimed that Beerbohm
possessed a reverence for Oxford. He opines that, “a love such as Mr. Beerbohm bears Oxford
could alone have steeped the book in sentiment as well as satire, beauty as well as mockery—and
beauty the book possesses” (Hackett viii). Hackett’s point has been somewhat deemphasized by
later critics (bar Felstiner) but Beerbohm evidently feels affection for Oxford, for the
undergraduate life that it provided him and for all its unique nuances. Hackett recognizes the
emotion of the text; the book is, after all, covered in the sentimentality of an Old Oxonian, but he
also recognizes that the satire is very much a prominent part of the text.
However, like Felstiner after him, the inherent link between satire and sentiment, beauty
and mockery, and parody and reality, is not thoroughly discussed or even posited. Hackett
identifies these contradictions, and makes the link between Beerbohm’s fictional Oxford and
real-life Oxford but does not go as far as to suggest that the satire is driven by its proximity to its
locale. The proximity of the text to Oxford life is often overbearing; in Zuleika Dobson: Or An
Oxford Love Story you get exactly what the subtitle promises, with very precious outside
influences or recognition. One of these circumstantial elements that Beerbohm satirizes is the
absence of sex from undergraduate Oxford. Danson is alert to the awkward nature of sex in the
text, quoting an example at the beginning of Chapter 16 with Zuleika on her knees, stroking the
carpet, crooning “Aye, happy the very woman that wove the threads that are trod by the feet of
my beloved master. But hark he bids his slave rise and stand before him!” (Beerbohm 241). The
brief submissiveness of Zuleika may be out of character but it is far from fantastical. Instead, it
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should be treated as a satire on both the propensity of the author writing about Oxford to include
sexually charged scenes just for the sake of being there and a satire on the inelegance of sexual
life for an Oxford undergraduate.
The satire is driven by the representativeness and a thorough understanding of Oxford in
1911 increases the understanding and wittiness of the satire. Therefore, Beerbohm can build
tension in a beautiful, dramatic, and novelistic fashion (as he does in the scene in the Duke’s
room) but summarily root the text in the realities of Oxford life by doing something so darkly
comical such as Zuleika changing her mind about loving the Duke on a whim. Suddenly the text
becomes “local” again. There is, in Beerbohm’s experience, no prevailing sexual desires in
Oxford, at least none that will linger long enough to matter. When Zuleika refuses the Duke’s
love, the contemporary reader (who is acutely aware of Oxford undergraduate life) witnesses the
satire working in conjunction with circumstance. The Duke’s love for Zuleika is not able to
realize its potential in an environment that does not foster long-lasting relationships; his desire
for her is more of veneration rather than true love. Similarly, to return to Beerbohm’s own
words once more, a novel, especially an Oxford novel, is always based around the love for “Miss
So-and-So,” precisely because the author is hesitant about eliminating sex from his Oxford story.
Beerbohm, then, satirizes both these faults in one foul swoop; he bases his text around the
addictive love for a “Miss So-and-So” but manages to eliminate sex at the same time. Sexual
tension is always on the surface, but it is awkward, overwrought, and then frequently humorous.
Conversely, the text is not based in romanticism like other authors that, Beerbohm believes,
shows a false ideal of Oxford.
Thus, the satire does ultimately prevail despite Beerbohm’s indifference to
categorization. The text may be fantasy (after all, Zuleika is a fictional text), yet it is based
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heavily on everyday Oxford and it is this particular environment that is being satirized. The
circumstances represented the larger failure of a genuine Oxford love story ever being written;
sabotaged by the undergraduate life, the femme fatale, the snobbishness, and herd mentality. All
these peculiarities to Oxford are mirrored in the story. Indeed, because the satire is so
profoundly based on contingent occurrences and therefore is, in a sense, less allegorical, the
locality of its satire shines through. Beerbohm knows Oxford, and knows that his readers know
Oxford, and thus the fantasy of the book is a mixture of history and fiction. The absurdities are
the fiction and the history is everything else; together they satirize pre-World War I Oxford.
Beerbohm wrote his aforementioned theater review (criticizing literature set in Oxford) in
1902, pre-Zuleika, and it is evident in it that he already had established his primary objects of
satire that, significantly, were grounded in the Oxford lifestyle. The intrinsic reliance of the
book on the Oxford lifestyle is meaningful because it emphasizes the locality of the satire. The
satire and locality become one, the satire is inevitably about the locale and cannot exist without
it. Beerbohm perhaps did see a world-problem with the herd-mentality of humanity or the power
of the femme fatale but the satirical form perhaps forces him to instead focus on the narrower
problem in Oxford. These are not so much common human faults but traits peculiar to Oxford.
The locality is perhaps limited to Oxford to the extent that even its close counterpart, Cambridge,
cannot be compared. For what its worth, S.C. Roberts wrote a sequel named Zuleika in
Cambridge where Zuleika is treated rather differently by Cambridge undergraduates. Beerbohm
admitted that, "I had often wondered what happened when Zuleika went to Cambridge. And now
I know beyond any shadow of a doubt” (Fadiman 6). The fact that Zuleika fails to enchant the
Cambridge undergraduates (or even that S.C. Roberts chooses to tell his story in this way),
indicates the uniqueness of the text to Oxford. Evidently, Zuleika Dobson must be considered
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individually and not in light of Zuleika in Cambridge nor Beerbohm’s quotations, even though
he is the author, many years after. But it is perhaps telling that S.C. Roberts and Beerbohm
considered the text to stand-alone in the sense that Zuleika Dobson remains a very Oxford kind
of love story.

Self-Referentiality in Satire
Beerbohm’s audience itself would have been almost exclusively Oxford or Cambridge
educated (Cambridge is mentioned at the end of the novel as the town that Zuleika will move
onto next) or from upper-class wealthy families. Beerbohm’s audience then, would have had an
atypical understanding of his objects of satire and perhaps be able to recognize elements of men
or women they knew. They were, in a sense, laughing at themselves and, if they were not brave
enough to do this, then they were laughing at the satire of the society and community in which
they lived. After all, as Swift opined, “Satire is a sort of glass, wherein beholders do generally
discover everybody's face but their own; which is the chief reason for that kind of reception it
meets in the world, and that so very few are offended with it” (Bogel 65). Those who did not
know Oxford would not understand the exact details of the city that undoubtedly contribute to
the satire. For example, throughout the novel Beerbohm makes frequent references to the
Emperors who watch over his characters and their fates. Beerbohm only tells the reader once
where the statues are located, at the Sheldonian Theater in Oxford, but the importance of its
location indicates that the readership would have been familiar with the theater. The Emperors
are nearly always described as staring; they, the ancestral gods, watch the undergraduates of
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Oxford and are portrayed as knowing about every event in Oxford. They “sweat, frown, and
relax, according to what they see happening” (Felstiner 179) facially registering like some fixed
magical mirror their ease or perturbance at what transpires. From the beginning they watch as
Zuleika enters Oxford, “the high grim busts of the Roman Emperors stared down at the fair
stranger in the equipage. Zuleika returned their stare with but a casual glance” (Beerbohm 4).
And they watch until the end, “down on the road, without, not yet looked at but by the steadfast
eyes of the Emperors. The last of the undergraduates lay dead” (Beerbohm 329). They are the
first to know Zuleika and they are the first to know about the mass suicides. They are
exclusively symbolic of aged Oxford, all that has come and all that has past.
What is so important, then, about these emperors as figurehead, and as figurehead
particular to Oxford? For one, it is significant since it maintains what Linda Hutcheon might call
the “creator’s position” (85). Hutcheon claims, “The creator, as originating and original source
of meaning, may be dead, as Barthes argued years ago, but the creator’s position—a position of
discursive authority—remains” (85). Hutcheon here references Roland Barthes argument in
Death of the Author and she diverges from his argument over the relevance of the author in
parody. As Barthes wrote, and to which Hutcheon is happy to agree, the author does not affect
the written text that is, “the birth of the reader must be ransomed by the death of the author”
(Barthes 6). It has previously been stated that the satire can be viewed without the presence of
the author. However, this merely related to determining whether or not the text may be
considered satirical. Once the satire has been established, then the author’s presence is
meaningful, more so than other literary forms, in determining the circumstances that originally
produced the satire. Hutcheon wishes to argue that for parody in particular, the author’s initial
thought processes can be observed after their “death” (i.e., after they publish the novel). This is
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where the symbolism found in satirical and parodying texts becomes significant because,
following Hutcheon’s example, one can argue that Beerbohm’s knowledge of Oxford (and his
reader’s knowledge) contributes heavily to how we interpret symbols. In turn, these symbols,
which are woven into the satire, translate only from their locale, meaning that the satiric symbols
of Beerbohm’s text necessarily confine themselves to Oxford at the turn of the twentieth century.
Thus, Hutcheon’s divergence from Barthes is significant for the Beerbohm reader (and readers of
satire as a whole) because it permits us to view Zuleika Dobson in relation to the author’s
surroundings. Satire cannot be read individually or singularly because it is always suggestive of
a situation or predicament that the author chooses to satirize.
For the moment, at least, we will employ Hutcheon’s work on the forms of parody and
manipulate this work to include satire. Hutcheon does make the distinction between satire and
parody in her introduction, establishing that satire, unlike parody, is both moral and social in its
focus and ameliorative in its intention (Hutcheon 16). Simultaneously, however, she recognizes
that parody can be used to satirize (16), and she even recalls the works of one of our satirical
authors, Max Beerbohm, as a traditional example of parody (6). Essentially, Hutcheon argues
that unlike literary forms, the author in parody, and satire, plays a significant role because of
their “self-referentiality” (85). For example, Beerbohm’s emperors are both self-referential to
Oxford and their subtle symbolism links back to Beerbohm’s experiences in Oxford. Other selfreferential symbols can be as varied as the language that Beerbohm uses. For example,
Lawrence Danson points to the two parts of Zuleika’s name: the exotic and mystical Persian
coupled with the bland English, hints at the mock-romantic and mock-heroic (115) that signal the
supernatural mechanism and imitative imagery of Zuleika’s pearls, which indicate the status of
her love for the Duke (they light up when she is in love, and dim down when she is not). Michel
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Foucault argued, “the author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the
author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture,
one limits, excludes, and chooses” (390). However, although Foucault here assesses the
tendency of critics to manipulate the author at their will, he, in contrast to Barthes, recognizes,
“in saying this, I seem to call for a form of culture in which fiction would not be limited by this
figure of the author. It would be pure romanticism, however, to imagine a culture in which the
fictive would operate in an absolutely free state” (391). Foucault acknowledges the reality that
the critic will always look to the author, whether we are correct to or not. Barthes wishes us to
see the death of the author, Foucault the eternity of the author’s presence, for better or for worse.
Hutcheon then employs Foucault’s liberality to include parody (and, for us, satire) as one
of the forms where the author is especially relevant. She asserts, “Parody’s overt turning to other
art forms implicitly contests Romantic singularity and thereby forces a reassessment of the
process of textual production” (5). In terms of Beerbohm, the imitation of other literary forms is
present, but, more significantly, to extrapolate on Hutcheon’s assertion, the background of the
author is also significant. The term “background” is not a reference here to how the author wrote
the book, his or her personal life, or any assumption made from the author’s relationship to the
narrator. Rather, and as Beerbohm’s book indicates, the exclusive symbolism and reference to
the author’s locale, in this case Oxford, is how the “background” should be defined and, as such,
is how Zuleika Dobson should be explored. This exclusive symbolism and self-reference is an
implicit and arguably unconscious component of the book. Hutcheon indirectly supports this
argument, “Parody is one of the techniques of self-referentiality by which art reveals its
awareness of the context dependent nature of meaning, of the importance to signification of the
circumstances understanding any utterance” (85). In Foucauldian terms, the author is neither
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“dead” nor “alive” but in parody it is inevitable that his presence will always be felt. Thus, the
signs of Oxford, such as the emperors, are significant because they are self-referential. We can
consider the emperor’s as wise because they have previously witnessed the likes of Zuleika, and
the behaviour of the whole undergraduate population. They loom and look out over Oxford
Broad Street and thus become a symbol of the text.
The Emperors may, with their past experience, be equated to the alumni of Oxford (and
even the Professors and other staff) who are the people reading Beerbohm’s novel and chuckling
at the foolishness of the character, but, more importantly, the familiarity of the foolishness. In
this interpretation, the symbolism of the emperors undertakes a new level; they are the readers
themselves who know Oxford better than an average person. The readers, like the emperors, are
themselves a part of the very fabric of Oxford. The self-referentiality of the text, emperors et al,
play an important part because these symbols forge the humor. In a sense, of course, they also
symbolize the gods, Clio and Zeus, who similarly watch over Oxford (halfway through the book,
the reader learns that Clio and Zeus chose Max the narrator to follow Zuleika and tell her tale).
Bakhtin describes the “exceptionally rich and original idiom of carnival forms and symbols” (11)
and employs the term carnivalesque (more on this in Chapter III) to describe the humor and
chaos that was originally found in medieval comedies and he believes it has not been so used
since then (109). Beerbohm evidently employs some of the carnivalesque elements of satire—
predominantly humor and subversion but, more appropriately, the original symbols found in the
carnival, and the carnivalesque element of the text contributes to the satire. For example, few
narratives could be written in such a light-hearted manner yet still witness the chaotic and manic
suicide of every young man in Oxford. The disorder is certainly evident in Zuleika Dobson—
after all, every man in Oxford has his world spun around when they fall, enchanted by Zuleika
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(and Zuleika herself is not immune to the chaos; at the end of the text she, briefly, falls for the
cowardly Noaks). The whole tone of the book indulges in the carnival atmosphere; it is at once
light hearted and humorous but also sinister with dark undertones.
N. John Hall notes the fact that Matthew Arnold’s description of Oxford in the Preface to
his Essays in Criticism is played on by Beerbohm in one of his accompanying illustrations for
Zuleika Dobson. However, Hall does not note the similarities between Arnold’s 1865
description of Oxford and Beerbohm’s opening description of Oxford in Zuleika. First is
Matthew Arnold’s elegiac description of Oxford:
Oxford. Beautiful city! So venerable, so lovely, so unravaged by the fierce
intellectual life of our century, so serene!
"There are our young barbarians, all at play!
"And yet steeped in sentiment as she lies, spreading her gardens to the moonlight, and
whispering from her towers the last enchantments of the Middle Age, who will deny that
Oxford, by her ineffable charm, keeps ever calling us to the true goal of all of us, to the
ideal, to perfection,—to beauty, in a word, which is only truth seen from another side?—
nearer perhaps than all the science of Tübingen. Adorable dreamer, whose heart has been
so romantic! who hast given thyself so prodigally, given thyself to sides and heroes not
mine, only never to the Philistines! home of lost causes, and forsaken beliefs, and
unpopular names, and impossible loyalties!... Apparitions of a day, what is our puny
warfare against the Philistines, compared with the warfare which this Queen of Romance
has been waging against them for centuries, and will wage after we are gone?" (Dougill
151)
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Arnold describes what Hall terms a “paean to Oxford” (xiii). Arnold praises Oxford’s charm and
the quality of its undergraduates, its close affinity to the romanticized era (the Middle Age) and
the idiocy of Philistines (a term Arnold applied to denote anti-intellectualism (Dougill 150)).
Many of these descriptions are reciprocated in Beerbohm’s opening paragraph:
That old bell, presage of a train, had just sounded through Oxford station; and the
undergraduates who were waiting there, gay figures in tweed or flannel, moved up to the
margin of the platform and gazed idly up the line. Young and careless, in the glow of the
afternoon sunshine, they struck a sharp note of incongruity with the worn boards they
stood on, with the fading signals and grey eternal walls of that antique station, which,
familiar to them and insignificant, does yet whisper to the tourist the last enchantment of
the Middle Age (1)
The similarities between the two are startling. Both descriptions reference the Middle Age and
the “barbarous” quality of Oxford’s undergraduates. The repeated phrase “enchantment of the
Middle Age” confirms that Beerbohm is parodying Arnold’s loving depiction of Oxford and
undergraduate life. Whereas Arnold’s Oxford is an example of humanity’s proximity to
perfection or the ideal, Beerbohm’s Oxford is antiquated and insignificant. Right from the
beginning, Beerbohm’s language creates the “self-referentiality” that Hutcheon outlines, and, in
this instance, as in many others, the idiom is presented in a self-depreciating and humorous
fashion. Only to the tourist is Oxford the city that it once was or as it has been positively
stereotyped (although to suggest Beerbohm was overtly critical of Oxford would be foolish;
Dougill perhaps finds the right term for Beerbohm’s satire, calling it an “affectionate parody”
(168)). The stark similarities between the two passages run further. Beerbohm, when
establishing that only uneducated tourists felt enchanted by Oxford, satirizes Arnold’s Oxford
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that, in contrast, is not appreciated by the Philistines. In this opening passage, Beerbohm ever so
subtly reverses the situation so that his own Philistines, the tourists (which may be extended to
include the outsider, Zuleika), are the ones that appreciate Oxford whereas in Arnold’s Oxford,
they alone are those who fail to understand it.
The close similarity between Beerbohm’s opening and Arnold’s lament implies that
Hutcheon’s theory that satire is self-referential can be correctly applied to large swathes of
Beerbohm’s satire. Beerbohm needed Arnold, or sincere authors such as Arnold, to satirize
Oxford. Arnold is the believer that Beerbohm doubts in his satire although perhaps “doubt” is
too strong a term. Instead, Beerbohm can be described as stressing and then making light of
Arnold propensity to dwell on Oxford’s so-called perfections. Therefore, the background to
Beerbohm’s book is definitive. It is not abstract, in contrast, it is exacting. Beerbohm treats the
undergraduates of Oxford differently than Arnold and sees no harmony between the
undergraduates and the town and the youth of the students contrasts sharply with the antiquity of
the university, “they struck a sharp note of incongruity with the worn boards they stood on”
(Beerbohm 1). In juxtaposition, Arnold paints a rather more harmonic picture of Oxford with the
undergraduates affectionately called “barbarians.” Their innocence compliments the perfection
of Oxford. But Beerbohm sees this differently. The undergraduates are a pack afflicted by the
plague of the femme fatale. They are young and naïve.
What is more difficult to determine because of the different time periods is whether
Beerbohm is in some sense lamenting the Oxford of Arnold’s era and wishing for a return to the
“true,” ideal Middle Age Oxford. However, this is unsubstantiated primarily because
Beerbohm’s text is so outwardly satirical and the fact that there were no ground-breaking events
in Oxford that would have changed the mentality or social class of the undergraduate population
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since Arnold’s time (if the novel were written after World War I or World War II this
counterargument might be easier to defend). In sum, what all these subtle references to Oxford
undergraduate culture cue us to see is that a full understanding of Beerbohm requires knowledge
of the Oxford of 1911. Beerbohm mocks Oxford in a nuanced manner, but the nuances remain
just nuances and nothing more. There is no scathing attack on Arnold but rather an inside joke
that is more pertinent to the real world. Indeed, in some fashion, Beerbohm recognizes this in
Zuleika Dobson. During one of Beerbohm’s narrator’s conversations with the reader, the
narrator Max notes that he has been selected as a narrator by the God, Clio, “because she knew
me to be honest, sober and capable, and no stranger to Oxford” (183). Whilst Beerbohm is
evidently not remarking that his form of satire is necessarily local (that, as Barthes would no
doubt agree, is far removed from the author’s jurisdiction), he is perhaps subconsciously
acknowledging that in order to comprehend this satire you must be no stranger to Oxford. The
similarity here between Arnold’s musing and Beerbohm’s direct satire of Arnold’s musings,
displays satire’s self-referentiality.
Zuleika Dobson is a work that is generally considered a satire in its purest form partly
because of its lack of plot and sole focus on caricaturing the Oxford ideal. The text is not a novel
or a novella, poem, play and does not rely on plot to drive the story. Beerbohm instead relies on
the reader’s knowledge of early twentieth-century Britain and, more significantly, an
understanding to what in this time period satire might attend. Although the unknowledgeable
reader can understand the basic satire—the herd mentality of the males, their collective
foolishness, the femme fatale, and the vanity of Zuleika—what the unknowledgeable reader
cannot comprehend is what this satire means in Oxford circa 1911. Indeed, even those with prior
knowledge have had trouble determining exactly what Zuleika Dobson is satirizing. Hall writes,
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Zuleika Dobson is a fanciful though hard-edged satire, but of what? Of the new woman?
Or the literary femme fatale? Of Oxford, university life, athleticism? Of rank, snobbery,
the herd instinct? Of dandyism, or novels of dandyism (such as those of Bulwer Lytton
and Disraeli)? Of aestheticism? (Hall xv)
Edmund Wilson was similarly confused, “What is the pattern or the point of Zuleika? Is it satire
or parody or nonsense or what?” (112). With even critics unsure as to what Beerbohm object of
satire is, the work is thus not easily transferred into a universal setting because the elements of
satire that are exclusive to Oxford just before the war dominate the text. Perhaps, then, this is the
best way to answer both Hall and Wilson’s questions: Zuleika Dobson is a satire on Oxford in
1911 together with all the excess baggage, past and present, that goes along with writing in this
period and in this location. Beerbohm himself supports this notion, claiming that his book was
“a fantasy” but that “all fantasy should have a solid basis in reality” (Hall xv). Beerbohm is
expressing his view that his satire is specifically about the satire of Oxford and nowhere else.
For example, although the herd-mentality of Zuleika Dobson appears conveniently to satirize the
herd-mentality of peoples everywhere, it does, in fact, only specifically satirize the herdmentality of pre-World War I Oxford because of the inherent self-referentiality of satire. It is
tempting to see herd mentality as a microcosm for society at large; however, the basis of the herd
mentality relies on a contingent context. In Zuleika Dobson it is Zuleika as the object of
infatuation that triggers this herd-mentality. The trigger is decidedly contextual and evidently
will differ from culture to culture if indeed it exists at all.
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The Importance of Locality Amongst Idealistic Satire
If Beerbohm’s satire was necessarily specific to Oxford, then Karl Kraus’ sorts satire
differently, if not ultimately completely juxtaposing the very idea that informs Beerbohm’s
satire. Kraus, the Austrian satirist whose satirical magazine, Die Fackel, had wide Viennese
appeal, produced his main body of satire in the play Die Letzten Tage der Menschheit (The Last
Days of Mankind). It was of course far removed from Oxford, being set on the European
continent during the Great War. Even though The Last Days of Mankind was written in play
form, it was never designed to be performed on stage. What requires that the play be read rather
than performed is its unfathomable length, five acts of fifty-five scenes, and its endless list of
characters and locations. Only two recurring characters feature in multiple scenes, the Grumbler
and the Optimist, and both provide differing views on the nature of Austria’s role in World War
I, the role of the press, and the complicity of Austria’s citizens. This led the critic Frank Field to
describe the play as “basically a play for voices” (103). But what do these voices mean to satire?
The Grumbler and the Optimist’s views are usually juxtaposed and form a commentary on the
events of the war, which are referenced in the other scenes. The play does not list war events
and does not seek to summarize its occasions; instead, the Great War functions as a backdrop
particularizing the attitudes of the Austrians for whom the war inevitably intervenes and plays a
large part. There is no decisive plot here, only the progression of World War I, and the scenes
are comprised only of conversation among the numerous characters. Nevertheless, the war does
frame Kraus’ play: in a linear fashion, its opening act focuses on the war’s beginning and its end
depicts Germany and Austria’s eventual defeat.
The Last Days of Mankind was largely written between 1915 and 1917 and, although Die
Fackel published some sections of the play, the play in its entirety did not appear in its final,
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book edition until 1922. One benefit of publishing after the war was that Kraus’ satire was no
longer hindered by war censorship and thus was free to satirize all Austrian attitudes. The
German pacifist Alfred H. Fried observed, “Kraus shows us the war at home” (Field 103) and the
war at home was to be where Kraus’ satire remained attached. We can regard Kraus as an
idealist partly because he takes a worldview on the human condition. In turn, this suggests that
Kraus’ satire might be considered universal rather than local or provincial as posited when
examining Beerbohm. One example of Kraus’ idealism is his wish for a country with freedom of
speech but without the negativity that modern press seemed always to create. Commonly
described as conservative in the sense that he was anti-modernist (Carr 768), Kraus viewed the
press, primarily the Neue Freie Presse, with suspicion and disliked what he termed their
hypocrisy. At least in his early years Kraus was also politically conservative, although he would
renounce these views as sentiment during World War I (Field 76). The description of him as a
conservative has more to do with his disdain for modern culture and warfare, rather than any
political views. Indeed, Edward Timms claims that the Neue Freie Presse was Kraus’ principal
target of satire until February 1920 (Post-War Crisis 88). By most historical accounts, the mass
media was biased and focused on insignificant targets over significant ones (Timms cites Kraus
indignation that during the war, the liberal press led a charge against government over damaged
tapestries; meanwhile, there was a period of national emergency due to malnutrition, influenza
and tuberculosis (Post-War Crisis 67)) and Kraus offered a more utopian, if conservative,
alternative; peace, destruction of patriotism and the sensationalist press, together with the
individuality of people. In some fashion then, we can consider, The Last Days of Mankind as
having a universal message.
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One of Kraus primary objects of satire is the role of the press, a group he criticized
throughout his career, and the transferable elements of his satire on the press are sometime
evident in The Last Days of Mankind. For instance, Kraus describes a frustrating scene (Act I,
Scene 14) where a celebrity, Elfriede Ritter, is constantly misquoted by the press. Her words are
twisted time and again, to the point where the questions become irrelevant because the press
have already decided on the answers. This fictional actress has just returned home from a trip to
Russia. The array of journalists manipulates her words to portray her visit to Russia as arduous
and, more extremely, explicitly state that she has been tormented. Kraus’ scene is evidently an
exaggeration but it is easy to sympathize with the actress, especially in today’ world where the
media is effervescent in its efforts to scrutinize and sensationalize, especially with regard to
celebrities. Hence, elements of sensationalism appear to be universal in the sense that one can
identify with this scene, the purposeful misconduct of reporters in their efforts to report the
secrets of celebrities, and easily envisage a similar one taking place in our present world. The
Austrian press attempts to coerce Elfriede Ritter into claiming that she was mistreated in Russia,
as a means to advance Austrian patriotism:
FUECHSL (writing): Rescued from the ordeal of Russian captivity, at the end of a
wearisome journey filled with hardships, actress Elfriede Ritter wept tears of joy at the
thought of finally being back in her beloved Vienna.
ELFRIEDE RITTER (wagging her finger admonishingly): Doctor Fuechsl, Doctor
Fuechsl, that’s not what I said. On the contrary, I said that that I had no reason to
complain—absolutely none.
FUECHSL: Aha! (Writing) Today, the actress looks back upon her torments with a kind
of ironic detachment. (46)
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Fuechsl is an example of the manipulative press and quite evidently, to the point of absurdity, he
twists Ritter’s words so they undertake the complete opposite meaning, in order for him to create
a headline. Yet we recognize Kraus’ wit concerning the gall of re-description, how he sets up
the alignment between “no reason to complain” and “ironic detachment.” This led Walter
Benjamin to comment, “But it is precisely the purpose of the public opinion generated by the
press to make the public incapable of judging, to insinuate into it the attitude of someone
irresponsible, uninformed” (239). The similarities to the modern day free press are immediately
apparent. Kraus views these actions as an example of base culture and thus, the satire would
appear to be relevant to all peoples because it is a message we can all observe. However, while
the elements of sensationalism may be transferable, it is possible to argue that the satire itself
remains self-referential and rooted in Kraus’ world.
Therefore, though there are aspects of universalism, the satire cannot help but be indebted
to the locale and period. For example, the media’s intentions are specific to Austria’s efforts in
World War I. Under the threat of the media sabotaging Elfriede Ritter’s role as Gretchen in a
forthcoming production (incidentally, this fact represents another self-referential sign because
the contemporary reader would have been alert to the significance of playing Gretchen and aware
of the popularity of the play, presumably Goethe’s Faust), one of the journalists, Feigl, suggests
Ritter would do better to cooperate with the press. Feigl openly says, “Let me tell you a secret.
It would do you no end of good not only with the public—but even with the press—to have been
mistreated in Russia” (Kraus 48). Feigl’s prerogative is to stir up patriotism amongst the
Austrians. Ultimately, Kraus’ satire does remain focused on Austria and Germany and thus
should be read within the context of Vienna during the war years. The self-referential signs,
from the small details of Gretchen to the larger details of the Austrian media’s objectives,
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indicate that Kraus’ drama is a Viennese drama. Simply to claim that all you need to do to make
the satire universal is to switch the names and locale is too narrow a reading of the play. Linda
Hutcheon and Michel Foucault dictate that the author, somewhat inevitably, will always be
present in works of satire (Hutcheon 4). Kraus is present in his play—the media play such a
large role in the play (so large a role that their presence overwhelms the Great War itself)
primarily because Kraus has a vendetta against the liberal Austrian press. The author’s
influence, coupled with the self-referential signs such as Gretchen and Austria’s relationship
with Russia around the year 1914, individualizes the satire here. Though the topics may be
thematic (criticism of the press et al) the satire itself is resolutely local.
This is especially significant given the realism of the play. Not only did World War I
shape The Last Days of Mankind, but also many of its scenes are drawn from true events. Franz
H. Mautner believed that “at least a third of the drama is identical with its raw material to its
central form” (Mautner 244), a sentiment that has been supported by Harry Zohn (50). While
Kraus deals with a large, world-encompassing event, its basis in Viennese society remains
crucially important to understanding the text. The reader, unwittingly or otherwise, encounters
hundreds of documents, reports from the front, and advertisements, all reincarnated in the form
of oral speech (Mautner 244). One such example from the Neue Freie Presse declares that once
Austria was cut off from the sea, the war “lost its significance” (Timms, Post-War Crisis 27).
This bias sentiment, supportive when Austria and Germany were winning the war and false
indifference when they were losing, is reflected in the text itself. A Prussian Colonel declares,
“A strategic retreat is always a success” (Kraus 221), while an Austrian General claims, “Have
we not achieved successes that arouse the envy of our enemies” (Kraus 210). The way the press
and the participants treat the war is heavily superficial. Moreover, many of the characters in the
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play, however brief their appearance may be, are real people, contributing further to the idea that
this is a uniquely Viennese satire. The essential circumstantial nature of the play is necessary to
be understood by modern audiences and is only understood “against the backdrop of Kraus’
society during the First World War” (Field 103).
Walter Muschg wrote that, “with the outbreak of war in 1914, Kraus’s art transcended
itself. From being Viennese it rose to become universal, from being literary it rose to become
religious… Kraus is a spirit who acts under higher orders” (Ungar xvi). From Muschg
standpoint then, Kraus’ satire on World War I (namely through The Last Days of Mankind)
becomes universal because of the general critique of the human propensity for war and what
Frederick Ungar saw as “Kraus’ primary concern. What mattered most for him was society’s
spiritual and moral misery” (xvi). The idea that Kraus’ literature was universal is evidently not a
novel one. To return to Hutcheon once more, Kraus’ text would appear to be more of a satire
than Beerbohm’s because it is “unlike parody, (satire) is both moral and social in its focus and
ameliorative in its intention” (16). Hutcheon thus makes the distinction between satire and
parody: satire is instructive and seeks to improve the human condition. What Ungar and Muschg
see as the universality of Kraus’ play contributes to the satire because Kraus expressively focuses
on the morals of society (a more in-depth look at universality in satire will be discussed in
Chapter II). However, Kraus’ satire remains local in the sense that the society he chooses to
represent is his own and his readership, while widespread, was limited to the Germanic-speaking
peoples of Austria and Germany (and, in Germany, only truly Berlin (Timms, Post-War Crisis
41). His satire is a critique of the Austrian people and their faults during World War I and
therefore Muschg appears overzealous in suggesting his satire is universal since universal
insinuates that Kraus’ satire can be applied to different societies and to different wars. The Last
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Days of Mankind is “self-referential,” a description that Hutcheon equates to parody and not to
satire, but it is certainly possible to extend this definition as we did concerning Beerbohm. It is
difficult to see his satire applying to even other Western European countries during World War I
because Kraus is solely and deliberately critical of the attitudes and actions of the Austrian
people and hierarchy.
In one scene, two characters, Patriot and Subscriber, discuss the problems of other
countries:
PATRIOT: I only read about a poor harvest in Italy.
SUBSCRIBER: Aren’t you confusing that with crop failure in England?
PATRIOT: That’s another story, and it has to be distinguished from the food shortage in
Russia (39)
The biased nature of patriotism may be applicable to other societies and eras, but Kraus’ satire
remains local to Austria because of the very fact that this represents his knowledge of Austria at
this specific instant. These rumors may or may not be true, but they are born specifically in
Austria. People may have been repeating the same, reciprocal sayings in France, England,
Russia, and other rival countries during World War I, but Kraus’ focus is on Austria alone. His
attention has a particular Viennese flavor and this fact is reflected by the role of the press in
influencing the opinions of the public. In fact, the xenophobia initiated by the press contributes
to the conversation of rumors and this couple; the press and the attitude of the people is
something that Kraus simultaneously satirizes. For example, upon learning (only, it must be
noted, an unconfirmed rumor) that a Briton was imprisoned for fourteen days for slandering the
country’s hopes in the war (the unnamed man suggested that Britain deserved to be annihilated
by Germany), the Patriot and Subscriber are quick to jump on the bandwagon against the British
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public, media, and country as a whole. They concurrently fail to recognize their own
shortcomings, both on behalf of the public and the media: the Subscriber claims, “No, the fine
English gentlemen certainly don’t like that kind of talk. They can’t take the truth. But then no
journalist in this country would ever let himself get carried away like that” (41).
The Subscriber’s words suggestively tease both the Austrian people and the Austrian
media. Evidently, Kraus is being ironic and the irony underscores the satire. The ironic
language can be treated as an example of one of Hutcheon’s self-referential signs. It is an inside
joke that Kraus is unveiling to the reader. The Subscriber’s words are not meant to be taken at
face value, and thus the ironic language is self-referential in the manner that it relates to Kraus’
audience who are privy to the knowledge that, in actual fact, Austrian gentleman are the people
not permitting any anti-patriotic talk, and the Austrian media are those who are getting carried
away in a wave of patriotism and hyperbole.
Although the modern reader recognizes the political divide that existed between Austria
and Germany up until the Anschluss, the cultures and people were intertwined through a shared
language and close proximity and freedom of movement between the two countries. So while
Kraus wrote in Vienna and satirized the Austrian people, the satire can be extended to include
the German people—indeed, by the fourth and fifth acts Kraus openly satirizes the Germans as
degenerate. According to some critics, the Germans were treated similarly to the Austrians by
Kraus, “as objects of satire that is equally as mercilessly as that already bestowed upon the
Austrians” (Mautner 247). The fact that Kraus was well read in Berlin and Germany throughout
the 1920’s (as late as 1929 his play Die Unuberwindlichen was performed in Berlin (Timms
371)) adds weight to the argument that most of Kraus’ satire attacked Germans as well as
Austrians. Thus, the self-referential aspects of his satire include both Germany and Austria.
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Kraus’ satire confines itself to the German speaking part of the world and, furthermore, it
applies to a unique time period, World War I. Edward Timms would appear to disagree with this
assertion because he links the role of the media in World War I to the role of the media during
the First Gulf War,
Sadly, those who fail to learn from the errors of the past are doomed to repeat them,
and the project of rationalizing the insanities of war is with us still, as can be seen from
recent conflicts in the Persian Gulf. The conflict in the gulf, as a New York Times
correspondent observed, “made war fashionable again,” but the blame lay “not with the
military but the press” which “saw itself as part of the war effort.”
The linkage between the propaganda techniques satirized in Die Letzten Tage der
Menscheit and the media coverage of the first Gulf War was noted by the veteran
biochemist Erwin Chagraff, who began reading Die Fackel during the First World War at
the age of twelve. In his memoirs, written after his emigration to the United States, he
recalls that as a student in the Vienna of the 1920s he prepared a lecture in praise of
Kraus. The ‘Last Days’ may have begun in August 1914, he observed eighty years later,
but they were still continuing in the 1990s, not least in the horrors of the Gulf War (79)
Evidently, there are similarities between the two wars and authorities such as Timms and
especially Chagraff, who lived through both wars, should not be ignored. But in terms of the
satire, the main object of focus here, the comparison cannot be transferred across eras, cultures,
and continents. Kraus’ satire is exacting—his target is the Austrian press circa 1918 and not the
world press or the presence of the media in general (indeed, Die Fackel can certainly be
considered a form of the media, published periodically and in small segments for the wider
audience). Just as the satirizing of the herd mentality in Zuleika Dobson required a
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circumstantial trigger, satire against the press similarly requires a trigger. Therefore, the effect
of the media on war may be similarly hyperbolic and unnecessarily patriotic, but in satirical
terms it remains necessarily local and unique to Vienna during the Great War. It self-refers back
to the German-speaking world, back to Vienna, and back to Kraus’ opinions. The Last Days of
Mankind is so heavily based on factual events that the realism of the play adds to its locality.
Indeed, many characters are real people and are specifically named, and this, coupled with the
aforementioned fact that many of the character’s words are real words extracted from military
reports and the press alike, establishes how dependent the script is on this period alone. For
example, in the media, Alice Schalek, that real woman who was Austria’s first female war
correspondent, is ruthlessly satirized for the glorification of war. The common man, in
particular, undertakes a heroic and an almost heavenly transformation in the arena of war; “How
is it before the war I never saw those splendid figures that I now meet every day? The common
man is really a sight worth seeing! In the city – God how dull! Here, everybody is an
unforgettable figure” (56). The name, Alice Schalek, becomes one of many symbols in Kraus.
She calls up Austria; her inclusion is no accident, it is highly specific. Likewise, the common
man that Schalek describes becomes a symbol embedded in the text. Only in the enlightened
world—the Western world of Rousseau and especially Marx—would the common man ever be
so revered or respected. Of course, Schalek does not truly revere the common man in anything
comparable to a Marxist manner, but that is satire’s whole point. There is no evidence of
“working men of all countries unite!” (Marx and Engels 39) in Schalek’s eulogism, although,
admittedly, Kraus’ conservatism does not mean he is advocating Marx either. But Kraus had
undeniably read Marx, even if he was said to believe that militarism was the main enemy and not
capitalism (Timms, Post-War Crisis 48). Austria, Kraus observes, is a country that pretends—it
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pretends to venerate the working-class man, but in reality does so out of some form of romantic
principle that is accentuated in the arena of war. It is a false notion of romanticism and also
shows how far removed the media in Vienna (socially more than geographically) were from the
war. A similar glorification may have taken place during the Gulf War but the Great War was its
own separate war. It took place between different countries, began for different reasons, and its
scale was incomparably larger. One cannot imagine the modern Western world—still postRousseau and post-Marx, but equally post-Hitler—depicting war in such a positive and
romanticized fashion. “Once more unto the breach dear friends, once more” (Shakespeare,
Henry V, 3.1, 1) would no longer be acceptable as it may have still been for many (but not
Kraus) during World War I.
The role of the media thus becomes different and, in relation to satire, once more it
probes at different areas of the press. If satire is self-referential, then the so-called universal
elements of Kraus’ text are not elements of satire. Instead, they can be considered themes of the
play. However, they can still be considered contributing towards the satire as long as we
consider these topics as individually unique; they are contingent to the era in which Kraus’ was
writing. Perhaps the most telling aspect of Schalek’s gung-ho journalism that roots her in
Vienna between the years 1914-1918 is her references to war as a “first-rate show” (57). She is
the stereotypically ill-informed member of the media, but she is definitively the Austrian version
of this stereotypical trend. Her views on the liberation of war are similarly contentious,
“Patriotism, you idealists may call it. Hatred of the enemy, you nationalists. Call it sport, you
moderns. Adventure, you romantics. You know the soul of men call it the joyous thrill of
power. I call it humanity liberated” (57). This last line is uncomfortably echoed twice more by
Schalek and is perhaps the singular line that delves the deepest into Kraus’ satire on war and the
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press. The self-referentiality of this final line is all too apparent; in Vienna and Berlin, the mood
was that the war was being fought to keep the people free. Ironically, Schalek sees liberation in
the faces of the common men. She has romanticized the war to such an extent that she believes
she can see the development of humans through the massacre of others. Her opinions take an
almost Darwinist twist; only the strongest survive and thus the killing will liberate and further
the strong who survive. She argues that whatever your reason for war—adventure, sport, hatred,
patriotism—there is a romantic ideal that is underlying it. This view can be determined as
particular to Schalek’s time and location. The significance of what Kraus perceives in Schalek
(namely, the romanticizing and glorification of man in war) is utterly self-referential despite its
apparent universality. The media’s role in Austria during World War I was particularly unique
and Schalek becomes a symbol of this uniqueness.
Kraus’ satire therefore attempts to show that in war, and this war especially, there is no
patriotism, hatred, sport, or adventure. There is only death, injury, imprisonment, and certainly
no liberation. Therefore, while the role of the media in war may contain some form of a
historical trend (if, indeed, there can be historical trends), each example is different and relies on
a particular society at a particular time and their media’s approach to warfare. The war shapes
the novel, and because its events do not dominate the speech but remain as an ever-present
background, the play becomes utterly indebted to the patterns of the Great War. To reiterate
Alfred H. Fried’s quotation, “Kraus shows us the war at home” (Field 103). That is, his satire is
domestic and so is Beerbohm’s.
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Chapter II
The Abstract Components of Satire

The Scope of Moral Satire: The Viennese Herd
A suggestion that was hinted at in the last chapter but not fully explored involves the
question of whether satire can ever be universal. Satire’s self-referentiality means it is firmly
rooted in its locality and period but there remains the concomitant potential for satire to attack
with universal potency. In short, satire may have the ability to be at once transcendent and local.
In Kraus’ work, the idea was briefly posited that there are elements of the text that were
universal or comparable to other locales and time periods. However, this was refuted by the
evidence that implied that these trends did not directly contribute to the satire because they were
ultimately grounded in the author’s background and private perception; the prominent example
being Kraus’ zealous criticism of the Austrian media. The suggestion was countered because
Kraus’ object of satire remains necessarily local.
However, what was not explored in the previous chapter was whether the more abstract
qualities of satire can be applied to other locales and time periods and, consequently, be
considered as expansive and all encompassing. Examples of the abstract qualities of satire often
involve human interactions and personalities, and primary among them, are power structures,
complicity, and the herd mentality. For example, in The Last Days of Mankind, Kraus portrays
the press as an intrusive and damaging force but the extent of their wrongdoings is ultimately
determined by the reaction of the public. In this sense, the satire against the public is comprised
of two abstractions; the power structure that is comprised of the press leading the people and the
complicity of the people for agreeing with the press’ sensationalism. Likewise, the herd-

mentality of the public is satirized with regard to war; in the play, patriotism is viewed as a
virtuous principle by most of the characters because everyone else believes in its cause. The
abstract elements of human nature as the objects of satire are also apparent in Zuleika Dobson,
despite the fact that in Chapter I we had defined it as a decisively local satire. But the abstract
human qualities persist; for example, the herd-mentality of the undergraduates, the basic human
weakness of falling for the femme fatale, and the power relationships between Zuleika and the
Duke. To reiterate, these abstractions remain important because of their potential (and, at this
stage, it is only potential) to cross over time and geographic boundaries and, as a result, create a
universal satire about the human condition.
These abstractions are more instructive than the elements of satire explored in Chapter I
(the definitive objects include press, war, and Oxford life) even if the author does not necessarily
intend them to be. The significance of instruction in satire is a well-trodden idea. Nabokov, for
example, claimed, “satire is a lesson, parody is a game” (75). This idea suggests that satire
points out human flaws and then seeks to rectify these flaws. Hutcheon also sees this as the
difference between parody and satire, and while it is possible to disagree with her, it is a subject
worth exploring nonetheless. Though Hutcheon’s interests lie in defining parody rather than
satire, she does, as a by-product, differentiate between the two. For her, parody is merely
imitation that “prevents any endorsement of the ameliorative implications” (36). Satire, by
contrast, can ameliorate. These ameliorative elements of satire include, by any definition, the
abstract principles that are present in Zuleika Dobson and The Last Days of Mankind. Whether
or not these ameliorative abstractions make the satire universal remains the subject of debate.
Evidently, Kraus’ The Last Days of Mankind exposes many moral issues. Kraus appears
as something of an idealist. This is something he is perhaps willing to admit; the professors in
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Act IV Scene 7 argued the point that the mental patient (and his supporters, who we presume to
include Kraus) were too idealistic. Kraus wished for the end of sensationalism in the press, the
end of nationalism and the abuse of German legacy, and for peace in Europe. In contrast to
Beerbohm who is focused only on the idiosyncrasies of Oxford, Kraus is preoccupied with more
of a worldview and a willingness to follow the descent of humanity into the atrocities of World
War I. One of the many speaking voices that appear in the Last Days of Mankind is the
collective voice of the Viennese crowd.” This crowd symbolizes, perhaps unfairly, the
representative voice of the Viennese people and, in this particular instance the satire is of a moral
kind. Northrup Frye wrote that the satirist demonstrates “the infinite variety of what men do by
showing the futility, not only saying what they ought to do, but even of attempts to schematize a
coherent scheme of what they do” (229). The men in Kraus’ crowd are of Frye’s variety because
of the ill-judged way in which they try to formulate and justify their opinions and actions.
Kraus presents a people who possess ambiguous (at best) values and beliefs. For
example, a refrain used by Kraus in the opening act of The Last Days of Mankind is the crowd’s
assertion that “We’re not like that.” The “crowd” is a speaking part in The Last Days of
Mankind (there is further analysis on the Austrian-German crowd later in this chapter, but this is
an early example of the influence of the mob and the ignorance of the collective views that are
expressed as a consequence of the herd mentality). The crowd identifies “a shady bastard,” “two
Englishman,” “two frogs,” and “Japs still in Vienna” (Kraus 11) before involuntarily releasing
the people who are briefly fugitives. All the accused escape into a house with a rear exit, before
the crowd claims, repeatedly, “We’re not like that” (11). They are ambiguous in their manner.
They are unwittingly believers of two juxtaposing attitudes and, in turn, employ each attitude to
suit their own ends. When they believe a foreigner is present they want to imprison, extradite or
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sentence them to death. Conversely, when a foreigner is not present, they foster the feeling of
solidarity in a modern, enlightened, and united Austria: “Everybody of one heart and one mind”
(15) declares the First Reporter. After all, they consider themselves people made of better ilk
than that.
Immediately the fickleness of the crowd is exposed but, more ominously for satirists such
as Kraus, a sense of self-entitlement and distinct lack of moral awareness is revealed. The
crowd, who come to represent Austrian culture as a whole, remain convinced that their opinions
are right and just. In Kraus’ Austria, there was the feeling promoted by some contemporary
writers such as Rudolf Hans Bartsch that, “the beginning of a new, improved people” (Timms,
Post-War Crisis 38) could be detected. However, according to Edward Timms, writers such as
Bartsch compromised their pride in Austrian heritage by espousing volkisch values (Post-War
Crisis 38). Following in the footsteps of philosophers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Bartsch
believed in the superiority of Germanness. Although Bartsch would later not embrace Nazi party
ideology, the adoption of volkisch and Fichtean values in Austria and Germany ultimately meant
a celebration of cardinal values were turned into a belief in the superiority of these core values.
As long as the Austrians believed in their own superiority, then they can never question their
beliefs, tainted as they may be.
Therefore, this overt celebration of values is offered by Kraus as a warning to the reader.
The danger of a population becoming too introverted and arrogant is highlighted. The World
War II comparison is again tempting: the volkisch values of the Central Powers morphed into the
radical ideologies of the Nazis. This warning can also translate to the modern world. It is easy
to draw parallels between the opening act of The Last Days of Mankind and today, even in an era
of relative domestic peace: the Tea Party for example, appears to share these values and fear of
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the threat of foreign invasion. Simultaneously, true American values are misused and
manipulated. The very name “Tea Party” not so subtly accuses the public of being non-patriotic
if they do not agree with their social policies because they are going against one of the great,
founding movements of the country. In reality, the Tea Party’s policies have nothing to do with
the original Boston Tea Party or any part of the founding of the new nation. Similarly, the
British Nationalist Party (BNP) adopts such a name to invoke pride in its members. Kraus would
argue, no doubt, through his satire on mass nationalism, that a belief in such superiority is
severely misguided. Believers in the universality of Kraus’ satire would consider examples such
as these as the way in which satire can be transferred across period and locality and, in turn,
applied to ameliorate the modern audience in addition to Kraus’ original readers. But this
answer is ultimately too presumptive and ignores the text itself. The Tea Party example is
facetious but it does serve to illustrate how minor connections can lead to grand conclusions
about the purpose of the satire. Kraus was attuned to specifically volkisch values. His satire was
influenced by men such as Bartsch and not by men such as Hitler let alone by any people as far
afield as modern day United States.
In The Last Days of Mankind, Kraus identifies a sense of ignorance among the people.
This is not directed at the individual’s ignorance or lack of education, but the collective
ignorance of people when gathered together. The witlessness of the herd is not dissimilar from
Beerbohm’s Oxford undergraduates; evidently educated, but unable to make their own decisions.
In this locale, however, there is far more at stake. What remains most striking about Act One is
the fact that the crowd is wrong. They are not wrong in the sense that they believe in their
entitlement while their culture descends into, at best, mediocrity, or in the sense that they possess
a duplicitous belief system, although they are evidently hypocritical. Simply, they are incorrect:
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misled, ill informed, and ignorant. The “shady bastard” (Kraus 10) that they presume to be a
spy, is first deduced to be a Frenchman because he asks for change and therefore his money must
be French made (the reader is privy to the knowledge provided by the stage directions that
indicate it is a ten-kronen gold piece, and therefore Austrian). The “spy” has come from the St.
Petersburg direction, however, and thus the ignorant conclusion is reached that he is a Russian
spy. The logic is severely flawed: the man is potentially paying with French money; therefore he
is potentially French; therefore he is a potential spy; he is thought to be travelling from the St.
Petersburg’s direction; therefore he is a Russian spy. The original fact that he was first thought
to be a French spy is lost on the crowd who are caught up by the mere mention of the word spy;
such is the wish to defend Austrian culture.
The presentation of Austrian domestic culture and ethnicity as overtly sanctified by its
own people is a deliberate technique employed by Kraus. He creates a scene of hysterical
Austrians seeking to reinforce their culture, but they are ultimately left looking ignorant and
bigoted. Kraus’ criticism is a universal one—he satirizes the somewhat sad human reaction to
close ranks and apportion blame to outside influence. In juxtaposition, as Kraus would have it,
and indeed something that his satire provokes, there is no principle of looking internally and at
one’s own character. The technique of using comic literalization sharply brings into focus the
negative and complicit role of the Viennese crowd during World War I and, indeed, the
complicit nature of many peoples across many wars. But, as in the case of Beerbohm, whose
Oxford undergraduates revert to the herd, there still remains the nagging reality that Kraus’ satire
is based on his own observations. This is not to say there cannot be a universal message, the
reader can compare and contrast the morals of the “crowd” against people in other wars, but this
universality still relies on the solid basis that has been established by the author’s region and
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period. This feeling is more profound in Beerbohm than Kraus (perhaps due to Beerbohm’s
relative lack of focus on morality compared to Kraus) but any universal moral message must find
its roots in the author’s specific experiences.
Furthermore, the crowd’s ignorance is truly compounded by their distinct lack of
knowledge or understanding of other cultures and races. Kraus, despite accusations of political
conservatism, was famously progressive in his sensitivity to social movements such as equal
rights for women and other races. For example, Kraus announced the founding of the Women’s
League for Peace and Freedom on the front page of his magazine, Die Fackel. Further, Kraus
has been accused as a “self-hating Jew” (Robertson 81) but this criticism holds little weight in
The Last Days of Mankind. It is necessary to make this distinction in order to understand the
meaning of Kraus satire: while Kraus did not lead a perfect life and while his theories have many
inconsistencies and may have typecast groups of people (Robertson 96), the basic satire of the
play is to criticize war, nationalism, and the way the press sensationalized both. Indeed, any
accusations of stereotyping would further the argument that the author’s authority is stamped
across satire. However, Kraus’ play appears to promote the inclusion of all cultures and he was a
fervent opposition of nationalism, once saying, “Nationalism is the love that connects me to the
idiots of my country, the people who libel my morals, and to the desecrators of my language”
(Kraus, Dicta and Contradicta 123). Furthermore, Kraus was particularly interested in and
reverent about Chinese culture. In The Last Days of Mankind, the Grumbler says to the
Optimist, “The only race strong enough to survive the technological life does not live in Europe”
(62) (for Kraus, modern technology had progressed because of war), to which the Optimist
replies, “Aha, your Chinese, the race most unfit for war” (62). In Kraus’ eyes, China had lived
through modernization before and he praised the Chinese “for having worked through the
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technological apparatus of the modern age in ancient times and kept their life intact” (Timms
60). Europe had continuously proved that it could not modernize without warring and continued
to prove Kraus correct because of World War I. Thus, this particular aspect of Kraus’ play
appears perfectly to depict the contrasting scope of satire. His satire is at once shared and local.
In this instance he focuses on a prevalent subject, the role of modern technology in warfare, but
his satire is also both confined and defined by Kraus’ own experiences and opinions. Therefore,
while many political commentators may note the negative role of technology in war, it was
Kraus’ own prerogative to acclaim the Chinese approach and deride the nationalistic Austrian
(and Western) attitude. Kraus’ experiences alone dictated this particular version of criticism.
In this opening act, the ignorance of the Austrian people towards other cultures is
ruthlessly satirized. First the crowd “discovers” two Englishman who are, in fact, American
representatives of the Red Cross. Nevertheless, the crowd shouts, “Speak German! May God
punish England! Let ‘em have it! We’re in Vienna!” (Kraus 11). Perhaps the crowd can be
forgiven for this, after all, English and American culture and accent must be difficult to decipher
(however, perhaps they should have recognized that the Americans are from the Red Cross and
asked the more pressing question as to what exactly two Englishmen, if English they be, were
doing walking around Vienna and openly talking English during the war). Secondly, and this is
when the crowd’s ignorance reaches a new level of incredulity, a Turk is mistaken for a
Frenchman, two cultures and languages that should be easily decipherable. The same phrase is
repeated, “Two frogs! Speak German! Let ‘em have it! We’re in Vienna!” (11). Thirdly, two
Chinese men are mistaken for Japanese—“Japs still in Vienna! The bastards should be strung up
by their pigtails” (11). Even when a voice of reason isolates itself from the crowd the conclusion
is reached by the crowd that “All Chinks are Japs” (12). Evidently, the presence of war is in
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some part accountable for the negative Austrian attitude and the criticism of war is undoubtedly
an element of Kraus’ satire; not only does war lead to senseless deaths but also increases
negative nationalism and the isolation of alternate cultures. In modern politics, the creation of
national and ethnic identities leads to international and inter-ethnic wars and can be used by
leaders of countries to maintain or gain power, both within in its borders and outside (Fearon and
Laitin). This has particular resonance in Hitler’s era, where he isolated the Jews both home and
abroad to gain the favor of the local population, but it is a trend that Kraus seems to have
foreseen—illustrated through his distaste of nationalistic wars. Fearon and Laitin argue that
social construction of ethnicities is one of the premier causes of war (this social construction
could work both ways; either negatively or positively, but both have their roots in nationalism
and the domination of ethnicity over the other (857)). But while his sentiment provides some
small elements of universality, the evidence he provides is distinctly Austrian. Kraus is not a
political theorist, he is writing a war satire and his text is based within the confines of World War
I. Hence, Kraus satirizes not only the war but also the sheer ignorance of the Austrian people;
the ignorance of what they are saying, but also the senseless ignorance of believing what they are
saying and treating them as cardinal truths.
Even the voice of reason is not spared from Kraus’ satire. One voice in the crowd
manages to placate the crowd by quoting a newspaper, “Such excesses of patriotism can in no
way be tolerated. Furthermore, they are liable to harm tourist traffic” (12). The individual is
satirized in two ways; firstly, he has received his information, and he takes this information at
face value, from a newspaper that, in Kraus’ eyes, represents the sensationalism that is wrong
with modern Austria. Secondly he is suggesting the correct view of inclusiveness but for all the
wrong reasons. This man in the crowd is not a voice of reason, however, simply another victim
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of materialism and the press. Consequentially, his scope is limited and can only ask the
question, “How is tourist traffic supposed to develop if this kind of thing goes on?” (12). One
feels that Kraus considers that the question the man (and the crowd) should be asking is along
the lines of “How are decent and enlightened human people supposed to develop if this kind of
thing goes on?” Those that misidentify the “shady bastard” are ultimately shown to have shady
motives.

The Oxford Herd
Just as there is a Viennese herd in The Last Days of Mankind there is the Oxford herd in
Zuleika Dobson. Kraus identifies the Austrian crowd immediately by permitting them a
collective voice in the play. Similarly, there is little subtlety in Beerbohm’s identification of the
crowd, “All the youths, quite under her spell…in silence they followed her” (3). Collectively,
the undergraduates are subject to Zuleika’s magnetism. They have little idea of what romance
actually is but are instead defined by a collective body. It is little wonder that there are only
three speaking male characters in the novel: the Duke, being the only one to arouse Zuleika’s
interests; Noaks, noticeable for his cowardice; and the Warden of Judas, who is not an
undergraduate and is Zuleika’s grandfather. Beerbohm’s narrator, ever the impartial sage, notices
that,
It was because these undergraduates were a crowd that their passion for Zuleika was so
intense; and it was because they were a crowd that they followed so blindly the lead
given to them. To die for Miss Dobson was “the thing to do.” The Duke was going to do
it. The Junta was going to do it. It was a hateful fact (151)

	
  

51	
  

Jonathan Greenberg would argue that this aspect of the novel “can be taken as a satire on the
herd instinct” (25) and, while the satire does not solely fall upon the men in the novel, their
collective tragic descent brings to light the mob mentality. The comparison to a “junta”—a
military led government with negative connotations—is particularly powerful if only because it
highlights how bizarre the collective decision-making process can be. The undergraduates are
vulnerable precisely because they are a herd. But to suggest that this universally satirizes the
herd instinct is to not look carefully enough at satire’s basis. Beerbohm’s herd-mentality was
contingent on the events of Oxford. His satire on herd mentality begins with the infatuation of
the undergraduates with Zuleika. The beginnings of this particular form of herd mentality are
very different from, say, the beginnings of the herd mentality in The Last Days of Mankind.
These separate influence means that there is always an inherent part of their respective satire on
the herd instinct that will be, however minutely, dissimilar.
Beerbohm’s narrator’s words best describe the men in the novel, “Two or three thousand
human bodies, human souls? Yet the effect of them in the moonlight was as of one great passive
monster” (162). The men of Oxford are “passive monsters,” eternally lusting and longing as
Zuleika slowly brings into question whether they are much more than human bodies that make
up this collective monster. In this fashion, Beerbohm’s words are just as harsh, if not harsher,
than Kraus’ critique of the Austrian herd. By describing them as “a great passive monster” that
loves Zuleika because it is “the thing to do” Beerbohm is unforgiving in his criticism of the herd.
Indeed, objectively his language may better apply to the Austrian herd because the costs of their
complicity are far more consequential than merely their own suicides. But the purpose of
Beerbohm’s satire here is to grossly exaggerate and while the language he employs may be
universal, the basis for his language remains the Oxford undergraduates.
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Many critics have noted that the literal emasculation of the Duke, who believes he will
expire when he catches a cold (Beerbohm 195), is comparable with the emasculation of all the
men in the novel who, to a man, are compelled to make themselves a servant of Zuleika. Indeed,
a common analysis of Zuleika Dobson paints Zuleika as a femme fatale. While this description is
indisputable—she is an enchanting woman who is the downfall of all the men in Oxford—if we
view the novel in strictly satirical terms, the scope of her fatality is so ridiculous that it becomes
challenging to see her as traditional femme fatale. Beerbohm seems to be asking if a traditional
femme fatale is so seductive and enchanting, then why could she not mesmerize every young
male who lays eyes on her? Qualified to just the undergraduates in Oxford and you have the
basis of one of Beerbohm’s most observable object of satire, the femme fatale. Thus, it appears
that Beerbohm is satirizing the literary creation of a femme fatale by creating the ultimate,
sanctified femme fatale. No other literary femme fatale can bring “great single cries of
‘Zuleika!” from leaping figures “innumerable through rain to river” (291). Beerbohm’s victims
of the femme fatale are the Oxford herd. Even his pathetic fallacy is satirical; only once the men
commit suicide has the “signal been given by Zeus for the rain to fall” (289). The pathetic
fallacy is ironically stereotypical and, because it is so stereotypical, the satirizing of the femme
fatale (who supposedly controls men, God and the weather alike) is completed.
The idea that the femme fatale itself is satirized goes against many of the literary critics
who recognize Zuleika as a femme fatale, but do not see it as an object of satire. Felicia
Bonaparte believes that “only a literal reading of the myth of the femme fatale can bring to light
its hidden meaning” (352). This hidden meaning, according to Bonaparte is “the communion of
love and death” (352). This is a valid point because frequently in the novel the Duke lyricizes
about the nobility of death. The narrator writes that the Duke believes “death was the one true
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bridal” (87). Indeed, death as a whole in the novel is treated as aesthetic or the ultimate display
of love. Says Zuleika, “She only knew that he must not die—not yet! A moment ago his death
would have been beautiful. Not now!” (109). But the more pertinent consequence of this
extraordinary femme fatale is not the focus on love and death. It is more simplistic than that as
the herd mentality of the undergraduates is utterly rationalized through the presence of Zuleika.
The Duke can be viewed as a singular representation of the Oxford herd; despite being
the leading male character in the text, the large proportion of his actions mirrors the rest of the
undergraduates. However the Duke can equally be defined by his own “leadership” qualities; the
death of the undergraduates has much to do with the way they follow the Duke who, in turn,
follows Zuleika. Beerbohm the narrator is quick to note that these “young men were the victims
less of Zuleika than of the Duke’s example, and of one another” (151). This is associated with
the herd mentality of the undergraduates that Beerbohm is so quick to satirize. The men of
Oxford are easily acquiesced into committing suicide—it is not strictly against their will, but it is
clearly against their best interests and their rationale. They do not make their own decisions and
they are not individuals—they are one of a crowd, the Duke’s herd or Zuleika’s. Precisely
because the herd mentality is so ruthlessly satirized, the aura of the femme fatale is somewhat
diminished. Indeed, the novel could rather be described as more of a self-inflicted homme fatale
where the men of the novel have their weaknesses exposed by the Duke (although the Duke
himself is clearly a victim of the femme fatale). This is especially true if we consider that
Zuleika is not truly beautiful (9 and 280), a point Beerbohm is eager to establish early in the text,
nor does she possess a charming personality. She is merely an upper-class woman with an
enhanced reputation who appears in a town dominated by a large, male, undergraduate body.
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She is nothing exceptional, but the men are decidedly unexceptional because of the fact that they
cannot make rational decisions, or decisions for themselves.
Ultimately, it is the Duke’s decision to commit suicide. He is the one who, in his own
mind, would set the example that “everyone would follow” (204). Furthermore, if we are to
consider the Duke a homme fatale (in the sense that he is more responsible for the deaths of the
undergraduates than the femme fatale, Zuleika) we need look no further than his sparkling
qualifications. Like Zuleika he is dominant amongst his sex—at Oxford he had been called
“peacock” (29)—and is brilliantly intelligent, unlike Zuleika, and on his way to a First at Oxford
(30). He has political friends, sporting accomplishments, and a name so long (“John, Albert,
Edward, Claude, Orde, Angus, Tankerton, Tanville-Tankerton, fourteenth Duke of Dorset,
Marquis of Dorset, Earl of Grove, Earl of Chastermaine, Viscount Brewery, Baron grove, Baron
Petstrap, and Baron Wolock, in the peerage of England” (57) –another example of a particularly
Oxbridge, upper-class joke) that he believes himself too entitled, more in a political sense than
sexually, to be turned down. Most significantly, however, he was “idolized by the
undergraduates of his day” (30). All these descriptions sound eerily like a male depiction of
Zuleika, if not even more impressive. Thus, while most commentators recognize “the neurotic
tease behind Zuleika’s femme fatale” (Danson 134) is it also possible to perceive the selfdebilitating homme fatale? And for just a moment the homme fatale dominates the book. When
the power dynamics are reversed early on in the novel, the Duke is truly the “peacock” because
he dominates even the most powerful femme fatale.
However, what is certain is that the femme fatale and homme fatale are satirized alike.
By creating absurdist characters and by taking their irrationality to new extremes, Beerbohm is
satirizing the very presence of their character. For example, the Duke’s name alone is an
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example of Beerbohm’s humour; it is so preposterously long and reeks of upper-class Oxford (a
humorous extension being Beerbohm’s footnotes that state that Tankerton be pronounced
Tacton, and Tanville-Tankerton be pronounced Tavvle-Tacton (57)) that one cannot help but
think that Beerbohm intended the Duke to be a unusual character. Indeed, the last words
between the two primary characters sums up their respective incongruousness. Remember, the
Duke has only come up with the idea of suicide in order to make “she, the hyena woman, would
be the fool” (151). But as he dies he promises to Zuleika to call her name in a loud voice
(admittedly, Zuleika reminds him to do that). Their parting lines are even stranger. Zuleika asks
the Duke,
“If you hadn’t forced me to kill my love, I would have died with you. And you know
it is true.”
“Yes.” It was true enough. (285)
The humour of the narrator’s summation completes the idea that both characters possess an
absurd form of logic. The homme fatale submits to the femme fatale, just as the rest of the
undergraduates submit to a product of them both. However, they are both utterly foolish, and,
because of the Duke’s foolishness in particular—even the sporadically present Gods take note:
“Shaking with laughter, the gods leaned over the thunder-clouds to watch him” (217).
Therefore, because of her foolishness, Zuleika cannot be considered a true femme fatale.
Similarly, to describe the Duke as purely a homme fatale is insufficient because of his
subservience to Zuleika.
Zuleika Dobson is no traditional love story of unrequited love. Indeed, the romance in
the novel borders on the extreme and is absurdist and this in itself points to the locality of
Beerbohm’s satire, as does the presence of a homme fatale. Who had ever heard of hundreds of
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undergraduates committing suicide because of one, single woman they barely know?
Nonetheless, these absurdities appear in some way relatable to real life. Copycat suicide is a
near proven trend, with the most famous historical example being the spate of suicides after the
publication of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther. David P. Phillips
coined the term The Werther Effect to describe the copycat phenomenon (Coleman 2). The book
was banned in Italy, Germany, and Denmark because in the years that followed many men shot
themselves at their desk, the same place Werther committed suicide, dressed as Werther
accompanied by the book (Coleman 2). Goethe’s text is, of course, completely unlike
Beerbohm’s novel and its sheer intensity, depth of character and first person narrative, make
Werther’s suicide in no way comparable to the suicides of the undergraduates of Oxford.
However, in real life, there really were mass suicides taking place in the name of Romanticism.
This aspect of “romance” relates to the more idealistic “Romance” that Sara Lodge claims
originates with Romanticism (and was continued by the romanticization of Oxford by Arnold et
al), “open self-love, yet self destructive wantonness and preoccupation with death” (40).
Lodge’s observation is particularly resonant when one considers that the Duke is idealistic to the
extent that he dresses as a medieval knight of the Garter before he jumps in the river to his death.
This is Arnold’s Oxford gone mad. Because the Duke’s actions are driven by this melodramatic
romanticism, we do not exhaustively blame Zuleika for his and all the other deaths. Beerbohm’s
decision to play with both romance and Romance sees these two notions fight against each other
in the text with disastrous, if darkly humorous, consequences.
We cannot view Zuleika as a villain or a traditional femme fatale because the men act as
part of a herd—“He forgot her levity and vanity—her wickedness, as he had inwardly called it.
He was thrilled with that intense anxiety that comes to a man when he sees his beloved” (162).
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The herd’s actions provoke the dominant question in the satire: why do the Oxford’s
undergraduates act collectively rather than individually? In a very literal novel, Zuleika
possesses no literal magic (or, indeed, originality, a topic discussed in Chapter III) and the men
can recognize her faults but not their own. But enchanted they remain. The literality of the
novel (in the sense that the suicides are not metaphorical, they are a real part of the satire) left
Edmund Wilson complaining that the “wholesale suicide at the end of the book is apocalyptic,
but to me completely unreal” (42), while Northrup Frye observed that the reader “should be well
advised to allow for ironic intention” (87). However, it is the literality that drives the satire.
Beerbohm wishes to emphasize the herd-mentality of the Oxford undergraduates and he uses the
most shocking and absurd means to underscore this. The literality of the novel is so intense that
it conversely creates a “crystalline surface of unreality wrought by the author for the character
and settings of the book” (Dupee 183). It is upon this surface that the satire can be found:
without it, the novel really would just be an Oxford love story.

The Pursuit of Power
The locality of satire is very much evident in Zuleika Dobson, but while we, the reader,
must understand Oxford in 1911 to understand Beerbohm’s book, abstractions that capture the
human imagination still creep into the novel. Rather than considering Beerbohm’s satire merely
as either one of two things, a satire that only applies to Oxford in circa 1911 or a universal satire
that is concerned with human plight, we can instead consider Zuleika Dobson in light of
belonging to both. Beerbohm is not an idealist; his satire does remain narrow and within the
confines of Oxford and the text can only be understood with knowledge of Oxford in 1911,
because, quite simply that is the topic of his satire. However, concurrently, trends of satire that
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are present in other texts are also apparent in Zuleika Dobson, albeit with a distinct Oxford
flavor. One of these trends is power and the human fascination to give meaning and resonance to
this abstraction.
The false power that the protagonist in the novel believes they enjoy frequently makes
them the object of satire. In psychological language, the notion of the false perception of power
led Smith, Wigboldus and Dijksterhuis to conclude that “one’s objective sense of power often
has a great influence on behaviour than the amount of power one actually possess” (378). In
relation to the satirical novel, this shows how satirical novels that develop a character (often the
protagonist) make them the subject of the satire through the characters increased belief in their
own power.
For example, Zuleika is almost defined by her opinion of power relationships. Zuleika’s
power is found in her beauty, as soon as people see her get off the train at Oxford station and
greet her Grandfather with a kiss on either cheek, the narrator, in parenthesis, notes, “Not a youth
there but would have bartered fifty years of his future for that salute” (2). But what is more
important is that Zuleika is acutely aware of her power over the throngs of men and is thus able
to manipulate them to her own ends. She is a wealthy heiress, already rich, living at the hotel in
Mayfair with innumerable gowns and gifts (16). Indeed, Beerbohm sets up the power hierarchy
early on in the novel, stating that “she was an empress and all youths were her slaves. Their
bondage delighted her” (22). This is an example of her awareness of having power over almost
everyone she encounters and this awareness means she can manipulate the undergraduates of
Oxford.
However, early on in the novel, Beerbohm subverts the power relations that Zuleika is
accustomed to. The Duke, rather than ogling Zuleika, acts indifferently in her presence. As soon
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as Zuleika meets a person, she has a conscious control over them. Thus, she has little concern
for them and their subservience means that there is little chance of true love. But remove this
control, as in the case of her first meeting with the Duke, and Zuleika is intrigued—objectively
she does not hold any power over the Duke. The effect of this power subversion means
Beerbohm’s satire is as direct as it is specific in its subject; the idea of tenuous and abstract
power relations that are treated as law by the character.
Beerbohm asks the reader, “Was the Duke bewitched? Instantly, utterly. But none could
have guessed as much from his cold stare, his easy and impassive bow” (26). The Duke is
bewitched by Zuleika, everyone is, but the impression he gives her means the normal power
relations concerning Zuleika have shifted. To return to Smith, Wigboldus and Dijksterhuis’
study, nothing has really changed about Zuleika’s dominance over men, indeed, the Duke is
likewise summarily enchanted, but now her subjective sense of power is having a great effect in
changing her behaviour. No longer is she dismissive of men, “at last, here was the youth who
would not bow down to her; whom, looking up to him, she could adore” (28). Zuleika’s
behaviour is directly linked to how she perceives her power relationships to men, and
consequentially, her ability to love a man. Now she can love the Duke because his worthiness is
displayed through his indifference to her; the Duke acts as if he has control over his feelings of
love, and hence he has power over Zuleika because she is denied her own source of power,
submissiveness. This may seem absurdist, and is presented by Beerbohm in a slightly fantastical
fashion, but these illogical power relations are the object of Beerbohm’s satire and underline the
fundamentally abstract nature of power.
Beerbohm satirizes power through its scarcely believable fluidity—such is the abstract
nature of power that one false move can undermine the very character. In Zuleika Dobson this is
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the Duke’s fate. Partly due to his wealth and connections, the Duke is seemingly the most
powerful man in Oxford, but more importantly, the power stems from the fact that no other soul
can attract Zuleika. However, as soon as he delivers his apologetic and amorous opening
monologue, culminating in those fateful words “I love you” (48), Zuleika’s love for the Duke
vanishes. Zuleika once again holds the power and her character’s psyche does not permit her to
love those who worship her.
Beerbohm’s satire here is highlighted by its proximity to the absurd; clearly, the power in
a relationship would not change at this velocity. But Beerbohm’s symbolism borders on the
magical, with the Duke noticing that the color of Zuleika’s pearls has changed. They were white
when she entered the room, symbolizing her love for the Duke, before their old color returned to
them. Their color, like her love, has faded away. On the other hand, the Duke’s pearls are
destined to remain the color they have been ever since he first laid eyes on Zuleika, just as he is
destined to remain in permanent love with her, suspended in this state. Jonathan Greenberg
notes that the supernatural changes of colour “signals the changes in characters’ emotional states
before they themselves are conscious of them” (25). Therefore, the supernatural changes
highlight the abstractive nature of power and how it does not truly exist as a definitive form in
the real world but only exists as a form in the mind of the character. Greenberg notes that
emotion is “everywhere treated as something that comes upon the characters from without.
Through the act of feeling, the Duke abandons the theoretical world for the experiential” (25).
Similarly, power relationships between characters act in the same way; outside actions, however
small, ultimately define whether or not they consider other characters beneath them, above them,
or their equals.
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The reader must remember that power is not a physical reality, but because it is treated as
an outside physical force in the novel (especially by the characters), power has a great effect in
determining the social relationships in the novel. Beerbohm mirrors Pope’s satire in The Rape of
the Lock. In Canto II, Pope describes the males attraction to Belinda, “Nourished two
locks…/well conspired to deck/With shining ringlets the smooth iv’ry neck./Love in these
labyrinths his slave detains,/And mighty hearts are held in slender chains” (43: 20-24). These
ringlets are described as love’s labyrinth, specifically designed to ensnare any heart that might
get entangled in them. Like Beerbohm’s pearls, Belinda’s locks become the symbol of power
that men seek to possess. The only difference is that the Baron literally seeks to acquire
Belinda’s locks, while the Duke must seek to keep Zuleika’s pearls white. Furthermore, both
locks and pearls relate back to power. Belinda is powerless without her locks. Meanwhile,
Zuleika is powerless when, out of her control, the pearls alter their color. The similarities
between Belinda and Zuleika early on in their respective texts has not been commented on by
critics, perhaps because of their respective outcomes: Belinda becomes the victim and Zuleika
the empowered survivor. But the women are associated through their radiant and addictive
beauty and the objects on their body, the two locks and two earrings, which entice and then
ensnare while simultaneously embodying their power status. The pearls provide a rare moment
of analogy in Zuleika Dobson, in the sense that the rest of the text contains literal and believable
events. This brief removal from the novel being read literally (literally, in the sense that the
text’s intentions are to make the reader believe that the story is real rather than analogous—here
we must ignore Edmund Wilson’s complaints that the story is unreal) is uncharacteristic but
perhaps indicates how much Beerbohm’s wishes to stress the significance of the power
relationships in the satire. His brief deviation into a fantastical tale, little else in the novel
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suggests that objects can change color, satirizes how seriously the undergraduates of Oxford treat
an abstraction such as power relationships: serious enough that it can absurdly lead to their
suicide.
Zuleika is able to succinctly recognize this change in the power relationships:
Not one of them ever touched the surface of my heart. You stirred my heart to its very
depths. Yes, you made me love you madly. The pearls told you no lie. You were my
idol—the one thing in the world to me. You were so different to any man I had ever seen
except in dreams. You did not make a fool of yourself. I admired you. I respected you.
I was all afire with adoration of you. And now it is all over. The idol has come sliding
down its pedestal to fawn and grovel with all other infatuates in the dust about my feet
(51-52)
Zuleika, acutely aware of the changing power relationship between the Duke and herself,
admires the Duke precisely because he is not like other men—he is unique, even if this
inimitableness is defined by a perceived indifference to Zuleika herself. Ultimately, however,
the Duke becomes similar to the other men and makes himself a slave to Zuleika. So why is
Zuleika acutely aware of power relationships when the men in the novel are not? Perhaps it is a
matter of gender or, more exactly, it is how Zuleika lives. Precisely because she is always
admired she is constantly confronted with subservience and therefore she can always recognize
it. In a novel that is admittedly not overloaded by emotional depth of character, Zuleika’s
character is distinctive because of her awareness of power relationships, which are, in turn,
established by her burning desire for love that can never be satiated.
This sense of empowerment is echoed on a collective scale in Kraus’ The Last Days of
Mankind. The Austrian public, Kraus believes, enjoy thinking themselves as world-leaders; they
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are the greatest country on Earth and all other cultures pale in comparison. This is why Kraus
presents to the reader scenes where every other country is troubled except for Austria. Tellingly,
Kraus does not always use the voice of the crowd to emphasize the empowerment the Austrians
feel, although the crowd’s false empowerment is a byproduct of the herd mentality. Kraus is
willing to use individual characters, such as the “Patriot” and “Subscriber,” who are not named
characters but nevertheless indicate to the reader an individual sense of empowerment. Kraus
gets even more specific, using named characters such as the “Austrian General” or the made-up
journalists Fuechsl, Feigl, and Halberstam. Kraus is even willing to use real-names in his satire,
citing Alice Schalek and Pogatschnigg by name. This readiness to identify individual indicates
that this sense of empowerment does not just occur when people are part of a herd (conversely,
remember Beerbohm’s assertion that it was precisely because they were a crowd that they felt
compelled to die for Zuleika), but also an individual problem. For example, the aforementioned
“Patriot” and “Subscriber” describe citizens in France being “Imprisoned for disseminating the
truth in France” (Kraus 41). Further, they discuss the situation in Italy, “Do you know there are
already draft dodgers there?” (40). Meanwhile, in Austria they are left basking in their own
fortuitousness: “Thank God we have a clear conscience” (30-31) and the provision of wool
blankets provides “an excellent example of the way everything works out in this country” (37).
Part of this reveling in their perceived power over other countries is because of the nature of war.
But it is a particular aspect of war relating to nationalism and power that leads the Austrian
people to act in such a fashion. Consequently, right until the very end of the play, the Austrian
people remain convinced of their righteousness even as the war heads towards an inevitable
victory for the Allies, the Austrian General cries, “Gentleman, one step more and the victory is
ours!” (211).
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The similarities to Zuleika are not direct but both satirists, Kraus and Beerbohm, criticize
the sense of empowerment by which the person or community is sustained by. Their very value
of existence, the high-opinion they maintain of themselves, is not based on their actions
(certainly, both Zuleika and the Austrians perform little to no altruistic or virtuous acts in the
texts) but on their own estimation of their power and subsequent superiority over others. Does
this commonality extend to universality? Perhaps, but the similarities between the two texts can
instead be attributed to the abstract nature of power. Because it remains undefined, it is easily
manipulated and comparative examples are comfortably drawn out from these abstractions. But
this is illusionary. Abstractions such as power structures and herd mentality are human
constructs and are easily manipulated to suit the reader without proper consideration of what
these texts are based in. They are based in the locality and period of the satire and not within
these abstractions.
Bertrand Russell stated that human desire is exceptional for “human desires, unlike those
of animals, are essentially boundless and incapable of complete satisfaction” (9). We chase this
abstract, and the futility that comes with the chase is a main object of satire. Evidently, this
thought can be applied to all the young men in Zuleika Dobson whose carnal desire for Zuleika
come to define their life. However, if we are to believe Russell, it is not a carnal desire that leads
the men blindly to chase Zuleika. It is something deeper than that, something that conversely
separates human and animals rather than connects them. In The Last Days of Mankind, it is the
want to be the most dominant nation on earth; in Zuleika Dobson it is the want of the males to
claim the most adored woman in Oxford or for Zuleika herself to maintain her lofty status.
Russell claims, “imagination is the goad that forces human beings into restless exertion” (10)
and, if we relate this to power once more, we can see that it is this imagination of power relations
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and the pursuit of the abstract notion of power, that Beerbohm and Kraus are accentuating here.
And by accentuating the abstract notion of power, Beerbohm is making it a premier object of his
satire.
Russell’s definition of power and its relationship to desire can also apply to Zuleika—her
own chase for a mate is similarly futile and insatiable as evidenced for her wish for an idol and
not a slave. This may suggest that Zuleika rejects any power she may appear to hold over the
male population; after all, she, like the throngs of men, is looking for love. For example, towards
the end of the text, when Noaks is the only survivor in Oxford, it is Zuleika’s turn to imagine
love: “man of my greater, my nobler need! Oh hush, ideal which not consciously I was out for
to-night—ideal vouchsafed to me by a crowning mercy! I sought a lover, I find a master” (325).
Zuleika continues, “I bow to your will, master. Chasten me with your tongue” (325). The roles
of Noaks and Zuleika are momentarily subverted (although, many have noted that Noaks is the
only “dismally realistic” character in the novel precisely because he does not conform with the
mass suicides (Bonaparte 359)) with it being Zuleika’s turn to bow down to the ideal of love and
cede power to the opposing party. The language Beerbohm employs to illustrate the power
relationships is unabashedly unsubtle, with the language of “master” and “slave” echoing the
“idol” and “worshipper” rhetoric used by Zuleika to describe the Duke. Indeed, her personal
quest is just as futile and insatiable as the men in the novel. At the end of the novel she orders
the train to be redirected to Cambridge, moving on to the next university town. At this moment,
she appears to be like the men, chasing love from town to town.
Nevertheless, Zuleika does not refuse the power she holds over the undergraduates. She
employs her perception of her power over men (to which the men are embarrassingly
acquiescent) to the extent that she rejects love and rejects men on the very principle of power
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relations. Lawrence Danson notes, “Zuleika cannot love any man but the one man who will not
love her” (117). Even the coward Noaks commits suicide in the end, once Zuleika realizes he is
not an object to be put up on a pedestal like the Duke once was: “As for you, little Sir Lily
Liver…I do but felicitate the river-god and his nymphs that their water was saved to-day by your
cowardice from the contamination of your plunge” (Beerbohm 328). The perception of power
roles has shifted once again. Noaks is summarily demoted and that demotion beckons his
suicide. Thus, Zuleika’s move to Cambridge can instead be viewed as parasitical—she is
comfortable with herself as she leaves Oxford, despite hundreds of men committing suicide
because of her. She departs with “her lips parted in a yawn, met in a smile…and very soon she
fell asleep” (350). She knows she has power over these men and will continue to wield it in
Cambridge as well as Oxford. This, at least, is the presumption, despite S.C. Roberts
aforementioned sequel. Zuleika Dobson should be considered within its limits and Beerbohm is
utterly suggestive at the end of the novel. Roberts does, however, make an important point about
the quality of character,
Here was Zuleika for the first time with a Cambridge undergraduate; and undergraduates,
she assumed, (as Dr. Johnson assumed of the waters of the sea), were much the same
everywhere. She hoped that the young man would not fall in love with her too violently
before she had her lunch (7)
Not all young males are the same but Zuleika’s attitude remains consistent. S.C. Roberts sequel
begs the question; is this an attitude that is particular to Oxford? In a sense, the inevitable
answer is yes, because the book is an Oxford fantasy and told for the purposes of Oxford people
to laugh at. Simultaneously, this can also be equated to a false perception of power once more;
Zuleika believes she can conquer Cambridge in a similar way to Oxford and therefore she moves

	
  

67	
  

to Cambridge for precisely that reason. She is a parasite who overplays her ability to coerce
others. Therefore, Roberts’ future is a salient one because it illustrates the way in which power
is satirized through Zuleika’s character and not just through the subservience of the Oxford
undergraduates.
Beerbohm exaggerates Zuleika’s knowledge of her power over men to the extent that she
knows that all the men at Oxford University have committed suicide because of her. The
Warden asks Zuleika, “What did they die of?” to which she replies “Of me” (335). This, of
course, is unrealistic but Beerbohm’s goes to this length to ridicule not only the conformity of
the men but the power that Zuleika now exerts. Thus, Zuleika is also subject to Beerbohm’s
satire in terms of her own approach to notions of power. Simply put, she believes she has power
over men and this parasitic appetite to maintain this power (at her own personal chance of love
and the moral cost of blood on her hands) drives her on to Cambridge and, presumably,
elsewhere. This narcissism was a topical subject in an Oxford steeped in the upper class
snobbery of the 1890s and early twentieth century. Oscar Wilde, a close friend of Beerbohm,
noted, “to love oneself is the beginning of a life-long romance” (Danson 118). So while
Danson’s assertion that “narcissism is the Oxford kind of love; and the love of Oxford is the
Oxford’s man’s unattainable desire for the image of his own youth” (118), refers strictly to men,
the same concept can similarly be applied to Zuleika. This topicality means that once more the
text is indebted to its circumstance. Narcissistic love is the novel’s subject of satire; as the
narrator asks early on in the novel, “Whom, then, could Zuleika adore?” (22).
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Defiance and Complicity
To claim that Kraus’ satire on war and media is universal is a mere tautology. Kraus
forcefully discusses both these topics and the themes are so large and all-encompassing that
comparisons can be made precisely because they constantly composite human culture. A better
example of potentially universal satire (that is, by necessity, somewhat instructive) would not be
merely Kraus’ criticism of the press, but would instead be how Austrian citizens react to the
patriotic sensationalism of the press and how it pertains to war. Evidently, if the Viennese
people had ignored the press or treated them with disdain, the press’ role would have been
nullified, and the satire would have been utterly local because the press had no widespread or
long-lasting influence. However, if the Viennese take the media’s word at face-value, then the
way they react to the press becomes a universal subject of satire. If the satire probes at the
complicity of the people (because they do not make their own decisions, these are made for them
by the press) and at power structures (whether these decisions are made by an individual or a
body such as the media, one group has significant power over the other), then these two
abstractions, power and complicity, may perhaps be in someway transferable to other similar
situations throughout history. It is a jump, perhaps, to leap from local critiques of power
structures and complicity, to universal critiques, but the evidence is feasibly there. The obvious
comparison that relates favorably to Kraus’ satire is the rise of Hitler and the complicity of the
Germans in the face of events such as Kristallnacht and the Night of the Long Knives.
Critics have pushed the issue as to whether Kraus can be said to identify with the political
views of one of his characters. Kraus uses the Optimist and the Grumbler to bounce opposing
ideas off each other. While the Optimist remains largely upbeat and patriotic about the war
effort, the Grumbler, as the name suggests, is staunchly pragmatic and reluctant to see any upside
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of the war, either on a larger scale or on a more domestic scale. It is not immediately evident as
to whether Kraus considers himself the Grumbler, or indeed that Kraus is professing that the
Grumbler’s opinions are the correct views. Earlier scholarship suggested that the Grumbler was
an extension of Kraus himself and espoused the views of the author. In 1957 Erich Heller
asserted that the “Grumbler is the author himself” (253). Even earlier, in 1931, Walter Benjamin
describes Kraus, “there he stands on ‘The Last Days of Mankind’—the ‘grumbler’ who has
described the preceding days” (256). Both Heller and Benjamin agree that Kraus is the
Grumbler, the narrator, of sorts, in the play and the character whose opinions are not only
strongly characteristic of the author, but rather completely representative. In this sense, we
witness the authority of the author on the play.
However, more recent scholarship has suggested that the Grumbler should be treated as a
character and not as an extension of Kraus himself. Harry Zohn recognizes this shift in opinion,
“the figure of the Grumbler that has been widely regarded as the mouthpiece of the satirist and is
even identified with him…the Grumbler is (now regarded as) a character that serves a literary
purpose, not a mirror image of the satirist or Kraus himself” (50). In 1986, Edward Timms
mused, “It is clear that the character of the Grumbler is by no means an accurate reflection of
Kraus’ own stance” (Culture and Catastrophe 390).
The difference in opinion is significant because it effects whether we view Kraus’ satire
being led by the Grumbler or whether the Grumbler himself is also potentially subject to derision
and included in the power structure of the play. Heller considers the Grumbler representative of
Kraus, however, simultaneously, he sees the Optimist as the “reasonable man” who is not
“satirically caricatured, but is throughout the Grumbler’s intelligent partner” (253). Heller’s
view can be considered somewhat contradictory, predominantly because, to the modern
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readership at least, the Optimist frequently offers opinions that seem to represent the very objects
of satire that Kraus ridicules; the complicity of the Viennese people, their acquiescence, and lack
of ethical responsibility. The Optimist is liable to offer opinions that are completely atypical of
any views that Kraus himself would offer. For example, he believes in the nobility of war, “The
Neue Freie Presse underscores with justification how noble it is of Count Berchtold to go out to
the front himself now, saber in hand, in order to meet eye to eye with that sworn enemy” (123124). Furthermore, he professes the rather naïve opinion that Emperor Franz Josef was “tricked”
into war (155). These views are so patently out of touch with the reality of modern warfare that
the Grumbler’s opinions become summarily poignant. So while, the Optimist can appear
reasonable (and can certainly not be considered an evil character like others in the play) and offer
sensible counterarguments to the often radical Grumbler (“Do you really believe the war was
decided upon by a few wicked men?” (153)), the Grumbler’s views, while depressing and
scathing, provide a more accurate commentary to the ironic scenes for which he delivers an
interlude. Primarily because the Grumbler provides these scathing, yet insightful and crucially
knowledgeable, interludes, he can therefore be most closely associated with Kraus, even if he is
not necessarily Kraus in his true form. He is the character that is not complicit, much like Kraus
himself during World War I.
Even Timms backtracks a little in the end, describing the Grumbler as a “simplified
version of Kraus’ satirical self” (Culture and Catastrophe 391). Therefore, while characters
such as the “Austrian General” are ignorant as defeat becomes inevitable to the point of being
delusional, “And have we not succeeded? Have we not trampled Serbia, gentlemen?” (Kraus
210), the Grumbler can intervene and supplement Kraus’ irony, claiming, “the devil himself
would have advocated a peace treaty that renounced all war aims” (197). He is not Beerbohm’s
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narrator who is self-conscious and divinely omnipotent, but neither is the Grumbler the complete
opposite of Beerbohm’s narrator. There are moments when the Grumbler is acutely aware of
telling the tale and, again, just as with Zuleika Dobson where Max the author and Max the
narrator remain separate, it is impossible to ascertain whether the Grumbler ever truly comes to
represent Kraus but there remains enough crossover between the two to see the effect of
contemporary events on the texts.
Nevertheless, the Grumbler’s self-consciousness is significant because, in a sense, it
removes him from the satire, and puts him in a position more akin to the authorial position—he
is on the outside looking in. Late in the play, the Grumbler asserts, “This is my manifesto. I
have considered everything carefully. I have taken it upon myself to tell the tragedy, which
breaks down into the scenes of mankind breaking down, so that the Spirit, which has
compassions for the victims would hear it” (204). The connection with Beerbohm’s narrator
continues; just as Max the narrator is literally divinely chosen and thus outside the satire upon
the people of Oxford, the Grumbler’s divine links removes him from the people of Vienna.
Additionally, he is not given a conventional name, suggesting that both the Optimist and he
belong outside the common satire of the Viennese people. They are not given generic names
such as the Patriot, Subscriber, or Crowd, nor are they real people. This leads to the conclusion
that the Grumbler is closely associated with Kraus the author, even if his views are not wholly
representative of Kraus.
Perhaps, then, the Grumbler is more representative of Kraus’ views at the end of the war
because the war effort so radicalized his opinion. The more conservative Optimist is Kraus’
conservative self at the beginning of the war, offering, albeit through sensible and logical
arguments, opinions that defend to an extent the onset of war. The relationship to local
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circumstances is readily forthcoming. But what is conclusively certain is that the Grumbler is
afforded more stage time than the Optimist whose lines pale in comparison to the length of the
Grumbler speeches, which are often more than a page long. Consequentially, the Grumbler’s
sentiments, whether they represent Kraus’ or not, is the more prominent view and the opinion
that leaves a lasting impression on the reader. The Grumbler wields the power in the play in the
sense that he is the dominant voice. Precisely because the play does not rely on character and
character interactions, the power structure in the play is felt differently than in Zuleika Dobson.
Firstly, there is the power the press and the government hold over the general public, the crowd,
and, in turn, the power the crowd holds over the individual. Secondly, there is the power the
Grumbler holds over the reader, because of the relative greater exposure he is given in the text
and because of his passionate views that perhaps echo Kraus’ sentiments. For example, a scene
set early on in the war (Act I, Scene 22) when the Optimist’s opinions about the war remain
singularly positive, demonstrates the length of speech afforded to the Grumbler over the
Optimist, their contrasting opinions, and an insight into some of Kraus’ objects of satire:
OPTIMIST: You are simply putting on blinders so as not to see what abundant
generosity, what spirit of self-sacrifice the war has inspired!
GRUMBLER: No, it’s just that I don’t close my eyes to all the dehumanization and
vileness it tool to achieve that result. If you have to set fire to a house just to find out
whether two decent tenants will come to the rescue of ten tenants, while eighty-eight
shady tenants seize the opportunity to do something underhanded, then it would be a
mistake to delay the goodness of human nature. Surely, there was no need to prove the
goodness of the good, and it was impractical to bring about a situation through which the
wicked become still more wicked. At best war teaches us an object lesson by increasing
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contrasts. It may well be of value in preventing war from being waged in the future. The
only contrast sharpened by war is the one between health and sickness.
OPTIMIST: In that the healthy stay healthy, and the sick remain sick?
GRUMBLER: No, in that the healthy get sick (50)
A theme that holds true throughout the play and is immediately apparent in this extract is the fact
that the Grumbler is the character in charge. Furthermore, the Optimist is the one asking the
questions, with the Grumbler summarily providing the answers; again indicating that he is the
character in control. Thus, the view that war causes “dehumanization and vileness” is the
prominent opinion coursing through this scene. In this instance, the Grumbler espouses Kraus’
own opinion on the nature of war; this is the power that the Grumbler’s character is afforded by
Kraus. He maintains an insight, he can see the eighty-eight tenants, the crowd, or stand on idly
by. In the Grumbler’s eyes, war is a sickness, a disease and no good can come of it—even the
“spirit of self-sacrifice” that the Optimist suggests is rejected because of the means it takes to get
there. The only potential redeeming factor of the Great War, according to the Grumbler, is that it
serves to “increase contrasts:” what the Optimist sees as spirit, patriotism, and heroism through
acts such as self-sacrifice is perversely ironic because it can only be established amongst the evil
and the atrocities of war. The scenes involving the Grumbler and the Optimist serve as some of
Kraus’ less ironic scenes and bring into focus the seriousness of the situation, rather than
highlighting the propensity to the absurd as other scenes do (where the character’s opinions,
although very believable, are devised to be ridiculous). Kraus’ presence in the satire is surely
felt in the Optimist and Grumbler scenes.
It has often been suggested that Kraus’ main object of satire is about the press (Timms,
Post-War Crisis 65; Field 88), however, it is also easy to see that the presence of war (and
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humanity’s reaction to it—this reaction may also include the press) is the object at which Kraus’
satire truly probes. The Grumbler is so anti-war that soon after his comments that war may
provide contrasts he goes even further to deny any positives of war,
OPTIMIST: The good become better and the bad become good. War purifies.
GRUMBLER: It deprives the good of the faith, if not of their lives, and it males the bad
worse. The contrasts of peace-time were enough (60)
The final sentence witnesses the Grumbler retract his earlier argument; there are no redemptive
qualities of war, even if it is as brutal as the Great War. Indeed, the Grumbler’s argument is
borne out by the advent of World War II—the horrors of warfare may serve as a contrast that
will lead people to say “never again,” but this proclamation will only endure so long. A new
generation comes along and the “contrasts of war” cannot stop new warfare. The Grumbler may
appear overtly pessimistic but his refusal to sanction any positives of war serves as a refreshing
contrast to the glorification of war by the other characters in the book. For example, war
correspondent Alice Schalek describes the warfare she witnesses in stark contrast to the
Grumbler, “Call it patriotism, hatred of the enemy, sport, adventure, or the joyous thrill of
power—I call it humanity liberated! I am gripped by the fever of this experience” (58). That is
why the Grumbler is so important in the play; he may play the devil’s advocate perhaps, but he is
also such an opponent of war that the reader cannot fail to sympathize with his views. Evidently,
patriotism is not always a dangerous notion or a feeling that, when felt collectively, can lead to
war. But in this particular instance it can and it ultimately did. Kraus’ view is a perilous one;
opposing nationalism by its very nature is unpatriotic, anti Austrian, and anti-German and during
the war it runs the risk of accusatory looks (and worse) in Kraus’ direction for fear of not only
not supporting the war effort but actively supporting the other side. In this sense, it appears that
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Kraus, in The Last Days of Mankind at least, is more concerned with critiquing warfare than he is
the role of the press.
Again, the workings of abstract satire play a large role in determining whether or not
there can truly be universality in satire. The components of war that Kraus hones—overt
patriotism, the herd mentality, and the power these two abstractions have over the people—are
the elements that are transferable to other wars. To say war is a universal property of satire is too
broad a definition; instead, we must delve into the abstract mechanisms of war on which the
author, consciously or subconsciously focuses. Therefore, merely being anti-war is not a
transferable quality of satire because the critic must recognize that each war is dependent on the
moment in which it occurs. But the more specific human qualities that go along with war, such
as complicity and subservience, can perhaps be considered universal because the reader can
recognize and compare these abstractions across time periods. Abstractions such as complicity
may not be applicable for every war but the abstractions may have the potential to be universal
because their existence is defined by and reliant on the authorial discourse or the satirical
moment. They are separate because of the fact that they are not concrete. Thus, the human
desire to chase an abstraction such as power, or to act blindly as one of a herd, are the
transferable elements of satire that can traverse the horrors of World War I to the significantly
more peaceful pre-war Oxford and many eras and locales besides. The satire is not dependent on
its locale like the satire against war or the femme fatale is. But the existence of these abstractions
is still contingent on both the author’s intent and the circumstances of the period. Therefore, we
can say that abstractions such as herd-mentality and power structures are partially transferable in
some instances, but they do not apply to every situation or culture. The mere fact that we see
two different types of herd mentality in Kraus and Beerbohm, one is triggered by mass
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infatuation and sees the herd in love, the other is triggered by World War I and sees a patriotic
herd, indicates that the abstractions cannot ever truly be universal.
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Chapter III
The Modern Carnival and Hindsight in Satire

Kraus the Prophet?
The most prominent example of complicity of the people in war happens to occur shortly
after Kraus’ death in 1936, and takes place during World War II. The Germans and the
Austrians were led by Hitler’s fascist regime and one of the most inconceivable questions that
comes out of World War II is how such a modern, developed, and enlightened country could
commit such horrific evils. Clearly, the complicity and herd-mentality of the Austrian people
that Kraus describes in World War I did not reach quite the same levels as World War II.
However, at the same time, there was no true reason for World War I except for the abstract
notion of patriotism. The similarities between Kraus’ opinions on World War I and the later
actions of the Nazis and events of World War II (Hitler took power in 1933, Kraus died in 1936)
has led some critics to consider Kraus’ work as prophetical. Kraus’ “prediction” was to highlight
the complicit nature of the Austrian and German peoples and to suggest that this complicity
offered no sign of ending. On the other hand, critics have further considered Kraus’ focus on
what he considered to be apocalyptic dangers as exclusively immediate. The significance of this
distinction will permit us to understand whether satire is local or universal: if satire is local then
Kraus’ satire is not prophetic because it concerns only proximate (in terms of time and
geography) faults; conversely, if satire is universal, then Kraus’ satire is prophetic because he
critiques the human condition.
The dangers of being complicit reached their zenith during World War II. This point,
coupled with the proximity of Kraus’ satire to the war, has led most critics to use World War II

as a point of comparison for Kraus’ prophetic tendencies (although, as we saw in Chapter I,
Edward Timms also compares Kraus’ satire on the press to the First Gulf War). Timms
advocates Kraus as a prophet and sees multiple parallels between what Kraus observed in World
War I and what would later occur in Austria-Germany:
His phrase, “Germany a concentration camp,” jotted down in an unpublished notebook,
shows uncanny foresight, especially when taken together with prophetic scenes from Die
Letzen Tage der Menschheit…No text could have been more topical in the concentrationcamp universe created by National Socialism (Post-War Crisis 543)
Timms offers many examples of the prophetic nature of Kraus’ writing and indeed some of the
events Kraus observed would be echoed in World War II and perhaps in other wars as well.
Kraus’ critique of the bombing of civilian populations can be viewed as a pertinent illustration of
his darkly apocalyptic premonitions coming to disastrous fruition. One example that Timms
does not use, yet may easily apply to the point he makes, is the aforementioned opening act,
where the crowd attempts to identify enemies of the state. It is also apocalyptic, and Timms sees
it as a sign of events to come where a Germanic identity will violently ostracize all other
identities. However, if we closely analyze the semiotics of the crowd and each step the crowd
takes in determining the villain, then we begin to understand a scene that is particular to Austria
during the Great War. For example, the (incorrect) identities that the crowd creates for the
foreigners can be attributed to Austrian stereotypes for that set of foreigners (“All chinks are
Japs,” and “No bathroom at 10 Downing Street…those filthy people”). It is typically
xenophobic, but the play relies on stereotypes that are of a particular Austrian variety. They are
not constant and will undoubtedly morph as both Austria and its relationship with the foreign
country change. For example, the reader is expected to know that a ten-kronen gold piece is
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Austrian money. Furthermore, the “Cabby’s” suspicion that it may be French money highlights
Kraus’ perceived ignorance of the Austrian people (10). Precisely because Austria and France
were at war is the Cabby’s suspicion automatically (and incorrectly) aroused. Therefore the
Cabby’s suspicion can be determined as particular to this period. Still another example of
Austrian culture occurs when the spy is led away by the police. As they are led away, the stage
notes indicate to the reader that, “One hears the singing of ‘The Watch on the Rhine’” (13). Die
Wacht am Rhein is a German patriotic anthem that was popularized during the Franco-Prussian
War (Fuld 608). The irony of the crowd singing this anthem is multilayered. First, the crowd
are singing a victory song many miles from the front, and far away from the realities of war.
Secondly, their celebration is based on their own ill-informed presumptions. Thirdly, it displays
their tendency to revert back to patriotic induced behaviour; their “victory” is rooted in FrenchGerman enmity and provides the basis for convicting the spy. It is no accident that Kraus’ stage
notes convey the locality of his play to the reader. They provide the humor, another stage notes
describes how the spy is thought to be a man because, “a lady with a trace of moustache appears”
(Beerbohm 12), and the irony; the crowd are ignorant because they do not understand their own
culture. They do not recognize the ten-kronen piece and they sing a patriotic song as the person
is led away to display their victory over a person whom they falsely believe to be a French spy.
Therefore, although Kraus evidently made some correct prophecies, the benefit of
hindsight permits us to make these connections. Kraus may have foreseen trouble in Germany
beyond World War I but Timms’ claim that Kraus could predict the concentration camps of Nazi
Germany is forcefully over-zealous. Kraus’ satire must be read in the moment; it can teach,
instruct, and preach, but his play also relies on the semiotics of Austria circa 1914. This
argument, however, does not mean his satire cannot sometimes transfer across cultures. These
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aspects of his satire are still forthcoming. But Timms and other authors who see Kraus as a
prophet extend a connection too far. Kraus was describing Austria and Germany as he knew it,
and therefore, the comment that “Germany is a concentration camp” should be read in
conjunction with an understanding approximate to Kraus’ era, and not the period after his
lifetime.
Alfred Pfabigan, another literary critic who believed that the actions of Kraus’ words
were prophetic, claims Kraus was “a prophet of detail who, basing himself on his magnificent
imagination, managed to use trivial occasions to predict catastrophes years before they actually
happened” (170). Pfagbian is directly critical of Kraus, believing him to possess an insight that
he did not fully utilize and that any new satirical works by Kraus completely evaporated during
the rise of National Socialism (which they did) (Timms, Post-War Crisis 6). Nevertheless,
Pfagbian imagines that Kraus’ vision allowed him to predict that the German-speaking world
would take a severe moral downturn. Pfagbian’s harsh words about Kraus are borne out of the
fact that he believes Kraus to be prophetical. But this grossly misreads Kraus’ satire. Pfagbian
confuses the universal aspect of Kraus’ satire with any potential prophetical tendencies. Just
because Kraus’ satire possesses these universal traits through the criticism of abstract qualities
and faults of human beings (the pertinent example here being the crowd’s complicity to
patriotism) does not imply he predicted the rise of National Socialism or any other events.
Kraus’ words in The Last Days of Mankind concern Austria during the Great War: they may be
adapted, tailored or transposed to compare to other wars and historical trends, but this potential is
a product of the transferability of Kraus’ satire and not its prophetic nature. There were
complicit crowds before Kraus and there will be complicit crowds again.
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Similarly, Erich Heller believed that Kraus “foretold the end of Austria-Hungary” in
addition to the advent of World War II because of the “gradual corruption of its (AustriaHungary) moral, intellectual, and artistic life” (237). Heller’s analysis appears a better fit to the
system; he recognizes that Kraus’ criticisms of Austria are based on the current trends that he
observes. If Austria were to continue along this path, they would find themselves in a political
and social environment that pertains to immoral and nationalistic behaviour. But, significantly,
as Heller points out, the corruption is gradual and Kraus does not ever claim to predict the rise of
fascism or World War II. Instead his satire provides a cautionary warning about the route of
moral, intellectual, and artistic life in Austria. Therefore, although Heller does not make this
connection, the play serves as a warning for the moment of what Kraus describes—there is no
prophecy here, merely a path that has begun to be tread upon.
In light of these efforts to connect Kraus to prophecy, we can understand why the play
takes place in World War I. All the ridiculously ironic scenes that simultaneously touch on the
sad predicament of Austrian society are very much a part of World War I and not of Nazi
Germany. For example, Kraus depicts a short one-line scene almost utterly reliant on stage
direction, involving a character named the Crown Prince (presumably Crown Prince Rupprecht
of Bavaria, the leader of the Somme offensive):
During the Battle of the Somme. Gate in front of a villa. A company of front-line
soldiers, wearing their death-defying countenances, marches by into the foremost frontline trenches.
CROWN PRINCE (at the park gate, in a tennis outfit, waving to them with his
racket): Do a good job! (127)
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Here Kraus contrasts the horrors of the Battle of the Somme (widely considered to be the most
horrific and deadly battle in World War I, if not human history), with the leisurely and
pleasurable activities of the Crown Prince. The naivety or blatant laissez-faire attitude of upperclass society, even those near the front, has disastrous consequences in the arena of war. By not
protecting its citizens, and instead protecting some abstract nationalistic ideal, Austrian
leadership has truly outdone itself. But black humor also prevails in this scene, as it is
depressingly humorous because of the absurdity that sees the Crown Prince at leisure failing to
comprehend that the soldiers will meet certain death. He bids them well, “Do a good job,” but
his well-wishes make the scene even more painfully laughable and dark. The whole scene is
laced with Kraus’ dark irony; even the stage-directions are not immune to his witticism as he
notes that their only true form of protection comes from the expressions on their faces, “wearing
their death-defying countenances.” But the stark reality that the Prince fails to grasp is that they
will be on the front line of the Somme where there is no protection as both Allied and Central
Powers alike would throw their men over the top and march into the face of machine guns.
Kraus point is a simple one; one million men from both sides died at the Battle of the Somme,
including around 450,000 from the Central Powers, and the Crown Prince was busy playing
tennis.
Erich Heller, however, does not end his analysis of Kraus as a prophet by suggesting that
Kraus foresees “gradual corruption” (237). Gradual corruption is a conceivable argument
because it is not so much of a prediction but more a recognition of current events and the
realization that, if extrapolated over time, the extreme degradation of Austrian culture may occur.
Heller goes on directly to establish Kraus as a prophet: “It was Karl Kraus who discovered to
what satanic heights inferiority may rise. He anticipated Hitler long before anyone knew his
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name” (249). The conclusion Heller reaches here is different from the previously quoted passage
where he considers Kraus’ satire to warn of the gradual corruption of moral, intellectual, and
artistic life (237). Instead, he sees Kraus as a prophet who predicted a Hitler-esque figure in
Central Europe. Evidently, this is an analysis borne out of the benefit of hindsight. If Hitler and
the Nazis did not materialize in Germany and Austria would we therefore consider Kraus’ satire
to be incorrect or irrelevant? The answer is probably not because Kraus’ text is relevant in the
era he wrote in. Consequentially, Heller makes a dangerous assumption to suggest Kraus
possessed the gift of prophesizing; Kraus’ satire would have remained just as relevant if a Hitleresque figure had not seized power because his satire is rooted in World War I. Clearly, the
subsequent arrival of Hitler and the Nazi Party gave the critics chance to canonize Kraus as a
prophet (Heller) or criticize someone who did not make enough of his gifts of foresight as Hitler
moved closer to seizing power (Pfagbian). One could even say that because of the universal
topics in Kraus’ satire (namely war), reading his work today allows the critic to make and then
popularize the connection between The Last Days of Mankind and World War II. But Kraus’
satire is not set in the future like George Orwell’s 1984 or in a dystopian fantasy world like
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. His is a true-life satire (remember that many of Kraus’
character’s quotations were from real newspaper clippings and official releases) inferring that
Kraus does not predict but enlightens. Both reader and critic can elaborate on his satire to draw
connections, but ultimately passages such as Act III Scene 42 involving the Crown Prince rely on
a Viennese humor particular to the period.
Other critics claim that because Kraus’ humor is so close to contextual events, then this
proximity creates the dark humor for a grim future. For example, Kenneth Knight claims that
Kraus satire is transcendent because “given just a slightly new emphasis” (151) the satire can be
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relevant to today’s world. Knight does not specifically mention whether Kraus’ satire has any
prophetic qualities, but does establish that because of its “note of desperate urgency,” his satire
can be as relevant in 1980 (the year Knight published his article) as it was in 1918 (151). Thus,
his satire is “home-grown satire but also European and International” (151). In Kraus’ work
specifically, the elements that transcend Kraus’ era, Kenneth believes, are the role of the media
and war. This would appear to rule out Pogatschnigg as an example of transcendent satire: his is
a specific case centered round the activities of an individual. The role of media and war should
be treated differently and as perhaps pervading universal elements. Evidently, Kraus did not
predict World War II or the increased involvement of the media in daily life and, indeed, Knight
does not believe that Kraus predicted either. The war and media that Kraus describes however
needed his own era and his own criticism to allow critics such as Knight to see the transferable
qualities of Kraus’ satire.
Gilbert Carr does not directly view Kraus as a prophet, but considers his work in light of
the future, “The forward momentum in his repeated confrontation with the present paradoxically
projects an ethical route beyond despair” (773). This assessment follows in line with a reading
of the play that does not focus on Kraus’ satire as prophetical but instead concedes that it must be
based within the present. Kraus’ satire ventures into the future but only in the sense that the
reader must make this extrapolation himself. If the reader can extract a warning from the present
then they can read the play with a view to the future path of human population. But any warning
they may extract comes from an analysis of the present. In Act III Scene 11 a character named
Paul Pogatschnigg appears, leading chauvinistic chanting in a German nationalist drinking club.
Pogatschnigg was the real-life leader of the Federation of German Postal Workers in Austria,
described by Timms as embodying the “nationalistic grass roots” movement of Austria (112).
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Timms contends that, “Kraus satire proved prophetic. Pogatschnigg, whose activities first
caught his eye in 1916, became one of the pioneers of the Nazi movement in the Austrian
provinces. It was he who arranged for Hitler to visit Krems on 13 October 1920 to deliver a
rabble-rousing speech” (Timms, Post-War Crisis 113). The legitimacy of Timms’ claim that
“Kraus was a prophet” is difficult to substantiate, especially in light of Carr’s claim that Kraus
could only project a path of despair based on the events of the present. Kraus needed the present
day Pogatschnigg and his nationalistic actions to declare an ideologically bleak future for
Austria. Notably, it is not Kraus that makes this connection but the critic—even Carr is culpable
of looking to the future. But Kraus needed the contingency of the present. Similarly, Timms’
point that Pogatschnigg would invite Hitler to speak in Austria just four years later (113), in
1920, is compounded by the fact that Germany’s and Austria’s path to fascism would be indirect,
with the intervening years dominated by the generally liberal, if not necessarily stable, Weimar
Republic. The benefit of hindsight when reading Kraus facilitates the links the reader can make
between Kraus’ own era and the Third Reich: in reality, the most Kraus’ satire can do was to
advance the present to project the future.
The opinion between those who consider Kraus to be a prophet is split. Some, like Carr,
see his satire observing Austria on a route to despair, others, like Heller, are certain that he
predicted Hitler and Nazism. Carr’s assertion seems more reasonable, especially if we consider
the local requirements of satire. Kraus comments on the current moment in Austria and if this
moment is permitted to extend across months and years, we can witness the country’s fortunes
gradually decline. This is the crux that results from mixing universality and locality in Kraus’
satire: his satire can be applied across time and location, but any application inherently relies on
the root of the satire, namely, its original locale.
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But Kraus was not wholly apocalyptic. Through the Grumbler, Kraus posits the idea that
Austria and humanity are not doomed. The Grumbler does not always grumble merely for
grumbling’s sake. Rather than playing devil’s advocate, he frequently offers an insightful,
philosophical solution grounded in ethics. For example, the Grumbler declares that, “what is
alive in the instinct of even the most enslaved mankind, is its longing to protect the freedom of
the spirit against the dictatorship of money, to protect human dignity against the autocracy of
acquisitiveness” (63). Here the Grumbler firmly represents Kraus’ views because he is no longer
grumbling but offering hope for mankind. In satire, claims Carr, an author such as Kraus can
derive “long-lost beauty from ‘found ugliness’ by realistically facing up to it each time” (779).
This section of the play proves to be a clear example of finding this beauty, namely human hope,
amongst the ugliness of World War I and the materialistic and money-bound culture that went
with this new world. Thus, Alfred Pfabigan appears incorrect when asserting that Kraus used
trivial occasions to predict catastrophes (170). Instead, Kraus also appears as a hopeful satirist, a
satirical author who does not always descend into the definition of a grumbler (or the Grumbler).
Hope for humanity is not foolish, even if the Germanic people feel entitled enough to shout, “Let
the German conscience, the self-assurance of power, alone be our commander and our leader!
It’s rallying cry rings out: More power! More German power!” (Kraus 176). Kraus was not
limited to merely describing a pre-determined apocalyptic road that humanity was set upon, but
also recognized the hope that he retained for humanity. Heller calls Kraus “a living spiritual
power” (243), and this description of him eerily resonates with the quoted section above where
Kraus talks about the instinct of mankind, the hidden spirit within, to protect its rights.
Consequently, deigning Kraus a prophetical, apocalyptic satirist is inaccurate because he fits
neither description. There is hope for the crowd yet.
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But not all critics consider Kraus a prophet. Frank Field is one critic who disagrees with
the idea of Kraus possessing prophetic tendencies. He claims that, “With the benefit of hindsight
it is easy to read into his polemic and satire an astonishing premonition of the events that were to
occur in Central Europe after the war” (133). Evidently, hindsight gives a skewed vision. More
pertinently, Field recognizes that the “political and intellectual climate of Austria-Hungary
between 1914 and 1918 was not that of Germany in 1933” (135). They were different, and
Kraus’ satire does not seek to compare both periods (in the way Arthur Miller’s The Crucible
was written, drawing parallels between Joseph McCarthy’s communist “witch-hunts” in the U.S.
in the 1950s and the Salem witch trials of 1692). Field notes that when The Last Days of
Mankind was published, “it was a tribute to the freedom that still persisted in Vienna” (135).
Kraus would not have been able to publish such widely read satire under Hitler’s regime. The
observation is a salient one and relates directly back to the purpose of satire: to indicate to the
reader the moral, political, social and other faults of each other and the region they inhabit. Even
Heller points out “Kraus was primarily interested in the realization of immediate dangers: his
apocalypticism was not projected on the future” (236). Therefore, Timms is incorrect in
suggesting that the play was prophetic: “The (play) takes us into the heart of darkness—the
ultimate horror that anticipates the Holocaust” (68). Kraus work, including the sections
discussing Pogatschnigg, remains self-referential and not prophetical.

Unofficial Satire: Kraus’ Modern Fool
In Rabelais and His World, Mikhail Bakhtin outlines his theory of carnivalesque. Based
on the unadulterated laughter of the medieval carnival, Bakhtin’s definition has come to refer to
the subversion of the dominant style and atmosphere. The carnival in the medieval world
	
  

88	
  

enabled the people to create their own laughter, devoid of all bureaucracy and authoritarian rule.
For Bakhtin, “laughter in the Middle Ages remained outside all official spheres of ideology and
outside all official strict forms of social relations” (Rabelais 73). In contrast, to the “intolerant,
one-sided tone of seriousness (that) is characteristic of official medieval culture” (Rabelais 73),
the carnival provided an extended moment where the people could laugh removed from social
constraints such as organized religion, official ceremonies, and etiquette. The proximity of the
carnivalesque to satire is readily apparent; it is unofficial laughter intended for the people. Kraus
and Beerbohm wrote in the carnivalesque spirit because they wished to subvert the official line
and create their own laughter of the carnival.
Bakhtin claims that since the novel represents the very essence of life, carnivalesque is a
necessary ingredient of a novel. In relation to satirical texts, Bakhtin, this time in his book on
Dostoevsky, notes that “In carnival…the new mode of man’s relation to man is elaborated”
(Poetics 164). An essential element of man’s relationships is the “unmasking” and disclosing of
the unvarnished truth under the veil of false claims and irrational behaviour (Pomorska x). In
short, carnivalesque is closely related to satire because of the ability it has to unmask the “truth”
that the satirist wishes to submit. Thus, carnivalesque can be seen as a tool employed by satirists
because of the fashion in which it seeks to show the viewer, or in satire’s case, the reader, the
truth amidst human follies. He outlines below the complex nature of carnival laughter:
Carnival laughter is the laughter of all the people. Second, it is universal in scope it is
directed at all and everyone, including the carnival’s participants. The entire world is
seen in its droll aspect, in its gay relativity. Third, this laughter is ambivalent: it is gay,
triumphant, and at the same time mocking, deriding. It asserts and denies, it buries and
revives. Such is the laughter of the carnival (Rabelais 11-12)
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The most pertinent aspect of Bakhtin’s description of carnivalesque is the ambivalence of the
laughter and the universality of its scope. By manipulating Bakhtin, we can infer that laughter in
satire does not necessarily have to occur at the expense of others. This ambivalence is strongly
felt in Zuleika Dobson where Beerbohm can aptly be described as both mocking Oxford and
equally basking in its steeped, elite culture. The more contentious aspect of Bakhtin’s argument,
however, is the assertion that the laughter in a carnival can be universal in its scope and a
microcosm of the entire world. In his eyes, this has been lost to modern literature because of the
overemphasis on negativity in satire. Indeed, he claims the universal capacity of laughter has not
been seen since the Renaissance period (Rabelais 12). Although Bakhtin does not unequivocally
connect this statement to satire, if we are to establish the link between satire and the
carnivalesque, then it becomes necessary to determine whether or not satire and the carnival can
be universal in their scope. If satire is not universal, the connection to Bakhtin’s definition of
carnivalesque diminishes.
One aspect of Bakhtin’s carnivalesque that is applicable to Kraus’ satire is the subversion
of normal practices and convention. One of Kraus’ most memorable scenes presents the “mental
patient” speaking sense amidst a crowd of German intellectuals and doctors. Although Kraus’
influence is likely more Shakespearean than medieval (Kraus’ translations of Shakespeare’s
works was published in German (Timms, Post-War Crisis 65) and the Grumbler even quotes
King Lear, “And worse I may be yet: the worst is not so long as we can say ‘This is the worst’”
(173)), the idea of the fool playing the only logically speaking character in the crowd represents
a crucial part of the carnival. Bakhtin consistently references the “feast of the fools” where
power roles and sensibilities were reversed and those occupying official positions (priests,
clergyman, lords, etc.) would become those with foolish ambitions within the carnival arena.
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This, then, is the grotesque element of satire: the fantastic combined with the absurd. But
Bakhtin is willing take this further. Rather than the grotesque being formed by, as he describes
Jean Paul depicting it, a “reduced form of laughter, a cold humor deprived of positive
regenerating power” (Rabelais 42) and “outside the laughter principle” (Rabelais 42), the
grotesque remains independent of such scorn and furthermore contains ameliorative powers.
Bakhtin believes that the supposed folly of the fool is deeply ambivalent, “folly is a form of gay
festive wisdom, free from all laws and restrictions” (Rabelais 260). This description is
especially significant when we consider Kraus’ scene with the character simply called the
“Mental Patient.” Precisely because the patient is Kraus’ modernized version of a medieval fool,
he is free from the misconceptions and restrictions that hinder the German physicists. To relate
back to Chapter II, the mental patient is not deceived by abstractions such as power or patriotism
and thus these become the object of satire.
Kraus employs this simplistic technique of the grotesque and uses it to reverse the
sensibilities of what is considered moral in Austria and Germany during the Great War. He
includes a scene where a mental patient is the only person talking sense at a Physicians’ Meeting
in Berlin. Quite how the mental patient got into the meeting is not explained and, indeed, is part
of the humor of the satire, but his presence among the professors perversely provides coherent
moral reasoning amongst a crowd of learned people whose morals appear misguided. For
example, the mental patient complains about those who “opened the door to impassioned lies
with their protest against attacks on German honor; and those who joined their ranks have drawn
German culture even further away from Goethe and Kant” (Kraus 141). The self-proclaimed
leaders of German culture, the professors and the intellectuals, have been imprudent in
supporting the Central Power’s cause in World War I. The widespread popularity of
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nationalism, Kraus believes, is sending Germanic culture along an immoral path. The satire
here, from one point of view, is particularly scathing because one who is mentally impaired
presents the moral opinion and is deployed as the voice of reason against the mistaken
professors. The suggestion is, then, that Germans and Austrians view it as insane to offer the
“radical” view that German culture is declining and that the war is not positive. Such a person is
in fact modernity’s version of the medieval fool. Though considered insane, within such socially
labeled insanity the reader deciphers wisdom. Kraus’ fool is akin to one present at the “feast of
fools” where you are permitted to look at the world with “foolish eyes” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 206).
But from another point of view, the professors appear foolish and idealistic nationalists—“Even
now the poison of pacifism has penetrated healthy brains, and the exaggerated idealism of the
opponents to war…must be seen as one of the worst evils from which the German national body
suffers” (Kraus 141). The professors who are portrayed as pro-war, claim that the opponents to
war (such as Kraus) are idealistic, but through the satire it is readily evident that their selfprofessed pragmatism is subject to bias. By this carnivalesque scene, Kraus frames his satire.
Both he and the mental patient’s recognize that as the horrors of the war increase German high
culture declines. The purportedly intellectual professors condemn this attitude as antinationalistic.
The professors treat the mental patient as someone who espouses ludicrous ideas. Of
course, this is part of the humor that the reader is privy to enjoy: the mental patient is not mad
but represents the only one speaking sense amongst a crowd of insanity. The professors echo the
views of other characters in the book because of the way they empathize with nationalism.
Ultimately, the mental patient is arrested because “he talks like an enemy of the fatherland”
(142). Here Kraus has switched the morals of the two, as the expected “liberalism” of the
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professors never materializes. In Bakhtinian terms, the mental patient and the professors alike
act in accordance with the ritual of the carnival, including the end of the scene where the
professors order the mental patient’s arrest. The carnival relies on “the suspension of all
hierarchal precedence during carnival time” (Rabelais 10), and the issue that is most important in
this scene is not in where the power to arrest resides but in the subversion of wisdom and
knowledge. Even though the hierarchy is seemingly restored through the arrest of the mental
patient, the fact remains that his sentiments are more attuned to the truth. He is the character,
and not the learned professors, that unmasks the meaning of patriotism and complicity and
reveals it for what it is.
Thus, for Kraus the carnivalesque in his satire serves as a mechanism to expose the
absurdities of the objects of his criticism. However, does this use of the carnivalesque pertain to
satire’s universality? Bakhtin claimed that carnival laughter was universal in its scope and that
the entire world could be seen in its droll aspect (Rabelais 11). Evidently, laughter is universal,
since everyone can enjoy the humor. But for the purpose of this argument, Bakhtin’s definition
of universality must be considered in full: whether or not we can see the entire world in this
satire, and whether or not the satire is directed at all and everyone (Rabelais 11). Can the reader,
employing Bakhtin’s definition, learn anything constructive (“positively regenerate” (Rabelais
38)) from Kraus’ satire? This particular scene involving the mental patient can be read
universally. It warns to mankind that even the most educated men can mislead and be incorrect.
The rise of nationalism sweeps all before it, and, in this sense, Kraus’ warning applies to other
moments in human history. All war is in some fashion a product of nationalism, and Kraus’
satire warns against nationalism everywhere. The fact that his warning is presented through an
Austrian lens is purely contingent. Perhaps, this is why many critics have incorrectly considered
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Kraus a prophet because he was singularly hesitant about the advantages of nationalism and
patriotism and was active in expressing his views. But it must be stressed once more that these
qualities, primarily patriotism, are abstractive qualities that are directed against all peoples.
Through these abstractions we see, as Bakhtin described, the entire world in its droll aspect
(Rabelais 11), the “triumphant” (Rabelais 12) victory of the mental patient over the professors
and the simultaneous “mocking” (Rabelais 12) of the collective German-Austrian sentiment.
These abstractions may permit us to instruct and ameliorate in certain circumstances.
However, despite this instruction, it is important to clarify that Kraus’ satire is still based in
locality. Indeed, the basis in locality is palpable, even the scene involving the mental patient.
Firstly, there is the simple fact that the scene is set at a Physicians’ meeting in Berlin. Of course,
this fact does not make the satire any less universal since every scene requires a setting. But it
does highlight Kraus’ roots and his area of focus. Secondly, and directly linked to the first point,
the critic must also consider Kraus’ personal campaigns. It is well documented that Kraus
maintained a vendetta against Sigmund Freud’s psychology and the two especially clashed over
their interpretation of dreams. Timms notes that Freud, the analyst, treated dreams as
“symptoms of neurotic disorder” but for Kraus, the artist, dreams were “treasured as creative
inspiration” with his late-night fears becoming stimuli for satire (Post-War Crisis 174). Timms
analysis is a salient reading and is echoed in this very scene involving the mental patient. The
mental patient’s opinions are treated as part of an irrational illness, whereas, in reality, his views
are the most morally inspired. The criticism of the art of modern science (not the physical
branch, but the psychological) is direct. Psychology has diagnosed the patient’s disease as
“suffering from the fixed idea that Germany is being driven toward an ultimate catastrophe”
(Kraus 135). Kraus here is satirizing what he considered the Freudian principle of searching for
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a “neurotic disorder” where there is not one. Thirdly, in the same scene, Kraus takes a shot at the
immorality of German science as a whole, “German science is a prostitute. Our men of science
are its pimps” (140). Kraus believed that the intellectuals had sold out to the nationalistic aims
of Germany, and he refers specifically to the ninety-three leading German intellectuals who, at
the beginning of the war, did sign a proclamation supporting Germany’s war aims (Ungar 136).
So, while Freud and Kraus “were the two greatest critics of the discontents to emerge
from Habsburg Vienna” (Timms, Post-War Crisis xv), their criticisms differ remarkably and
Kraus’ personal battles infiltrate the moral satire. This observation is analogous to Kraus’
continued war against the role of the Austrian press that often dominates The Last Days of
Mankind; evidently, it is an important and multi-faceted topic that Kraus feels passionate about
but it does sometimes deter from the primary focus of the play that is anti-war. Indeed, the
strength of locality is increased by the fact that the moral opinions do seem to mirror Kraus point
of view. Kraus’ own views are approximate to the mental patient’s views, and thus the reader
needs to consider that Kraus’ influence on the morality that the play discusses is absolute. This
does not refute the idea that his satire cannot instruct, but it does confirm satire’s necessary
locality that moves in conjunction with its universality.
The relationship to the carnival becomes increasingly tenuous the more authorial intent
we judge to be in Kraus’ satire. But Bakhtin does provide room for authorial inclusion, so long
as the laughter is likewise felt in the passages. Bakhtin recognizes that even in Rabelais’ novel,
Gargantua and Pantagruel, the shining light of the carnivalesque form, patriotism was sweeping
the land. The following passage begins with Bakhtin’s own words and follows with the words of
Rabelais’ character, the town herald, in quotation marks,
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But now he speaks in the solemn and pompous tone of the town herald, resounding with
the national patriotic enthusiasm of the time when Rabelais was writing his novel. The
historic importance of that time is directly expressed in the following words: “I would
deem it very disgraceful indeed to stand aside as but an idle spectator whilst so many
valiant and eloquent heroes perform soul-stirring roles in the magnificent epic spectacle
all Europe watches today.” But even this solemn, pompous, and monumental tone is
combined with other elements, for instance, with indecent jokes about the Corinthian
women who served military defense after their own fashion (Rabelais 178)
Like Kraus, Rabelais is not immune to contemporary occasions and it just so happens that both
authors must contend with patriotism and war in Europe. The last portion of the quoted passage
is important for Bakhtin, the ability to induce laughter in spite of current atrocities and more
serious, negative satire. Kraus never quite achieves this combination, this is not to say his satire
is of a lower quality than Rabelais (although Bakhtin would argue it was), but it prevents him
from treating satire as healing by laughter rather than through negativity. Rabelais, meanwhile,
can “defend the rights of laughter which must prevail even in the most serious historic struggle”
(Rabelais 179)—and Kraus’ was the most serious. But though Kraus’ polemics are stamped
across the text, the instructive qualities still persist through one of Bakhtin’s most important
themes of the carnival, the mask. The mask “contains the playful elements of life; it is based on
a peculiar interrelation of reality and image” (Rabelais 40). This interrelation is especially
important for Kraus because he relies on carnivalesque scenes, such as those involving the
mental patient, to project his image. Unveiling the mental patient as the fool who speaks sense is
the Bakhtinian equivalent of unmasking the truth at the carnival through the power of
subversion.
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So far Bakhtin’s criticism functions here to illustrate the carnivalesque nature of satire
and the workings of the grotesque in satire. However, this application to satire is a sentiment
that Bakhtin himself would likely disagree with. For him, modern satire pales in comparison to
the carnivals of the Middle Ages because it is devoid of any ameliorative potential. The parody
of modern times, writes Bakhtin, is far removed from the folk, carnival culture. Bakhtin,
referring to modern satirists, claims that negativity equates to the absence of universality, “the
satirist whose laughter is negative places himself above the object of his mockery, he is opposed
to it. The wholeness of the world’s comic aspect is destroyed, and that which appears comic
becomes a private reaction” (Rabelais 12). Kraus’ satire appears to conform to Bakhtin’s claim
because of the negative qualities of his satire, and, therefore, Bakhtin would imply that
compliance hinders his potential to write a universal satire. Bakhtin proclaims that no satire
since Rabelais has possessed this quality; modern parody, as he calls it, is confined to negativity.
The modern satirist, such as Kraus or Beerbohm, can “praise laughter’s liberating power, but
there is no hint of its power of regeneration. Laughter loses its gay and joyful tone” (Rabelais
38).
Bakhtin writes that the “positive pole of grotesque realism drops out and is replaced by
moral sententiousness and abstract concepts” (Rabelais 53). His caustic attack on modern satire
and, presumably, Kraus’ satire as well, is no different. Bakhtin would argue that Kraus’ satire is
overtly apocalyptic and devoid of the positive pole of grotesque realism and thus his satire fails
to ameliorate. Bakhtin perhaps assumes too much in surmising that all recent satire is culpable
of being negative, lifeless, and meaningless; still his point that only abstract concepts remain is
pertinent here. The contention, then, is whether or not these abstractions can ameliorate and,
through the satirizing of the abstract, provide the reader with a positive message to take away
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from the satire, one enabled by gay laughter rather than irony. The focus on the moral takes
away from the laughter (Rabelais 62); nonetheless, in relation to the universality of satire, the
abstract remains important because it maintains the potential to be universal, in spite of
Bakhtin’s criticism of abstractions being weighed down by negativity and not being freed by the
unadulterated joy of positive grotesque realism.
Kraus, who is is frequently described as being apocalyptic (Edward Timms gave two of
his books the subtitle Karl Kraus: Apocalyptic Satirist) saw no future for the contemporary
Austria he lived in. In contrast to the scene involving the mental patient, how Kraus ends his
play thoroughly supports Bakhtin’s argument that modern satire is devoid of the positive pole of
grotesque realism and therefore laughter. The mental patient scene is richly Bakhtinian because
it subverts, but the closing scene is anti-Bakhtinian and is defined by an extreme negativity that
border on being apocalyptic.
Kraus’ final scene is the longest in the play, spanning thirty-two pages, and its latter half,
immediately after the war reaches its bloody conclusion, is dominated by a dream-like sequence
where a new setting replaces the old with hallucinationory velocity. We witness, then, in quick
succession, predominantly by Kraus’ hitherto sparsely used stage directions, the unfair trials and
death sentences of soldiers, soldiers burying men in the Carpathians, children playing with a
soon to explode shell, drunk officers, Flanders, Winter in Asinara, prisoners with cholera,
corpses standing upright with their rifles ostensibly ready, and many more morbidly inspired
scenes. This is not to say that Kraus’ apocalypticism as the war closes was unwarranted or
erroneous. The sheer inventiveness in this scene may hint at the carnivalesque once more;
Kraus, drifting from location to location, presents the organized chaos of human warfare. But in
the ending to the play he moves away from genuine satire, away from the oxymoronic sanity of
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the mental patient or the ironic patriotism of the crowd. For the contemporary reader, those
living in the satire, there is no humor. Instead he is consumed by the need to confront the
negativity that he sees. Again, this observation is not a criticism of Kraus, but Bakhtin’s claim
that modern satire is too negative cannot be ignored here. There is no humor in Kraus’ closing
moments, not even of the dry, ironic kind. Beerbohm’s play also ends in mass death, but the
scale of the deaths is so grotesquely unrealistic and devoid of human attachment or sentiment,
that one cannot help smirking slightly at the sheer ridiculousness of the black humor.
The final pages of The Last Days of Mankind witness a continuation of the dream-like
sequence but now include a variety of speaking voices to end the play. There are eleven voices;
“The Frozen Soldiers,” “The Old Serbian Peasant,” “The Twelve Hundred Horses,” “Leonardo
Da Vinci,” “The Lusitania Children,” “Army Dogs,” “The Dead Woods,” “The Mother,” “The
Ravens,” “The Women Auxiliaries,” and “The Unborn Son.” All these voices lament war except
for the Ravens who celebrate, “Ravens, since the killing started, never have run short of fodder”
(236). The Lusitania children, already dead, eerily bob across the ocean, “we drift and we don’t
know where” (233). Da Vinci withholds his design for submarines “because of man’s evil
nature, which would lead him to utilize it for committing murders” (233). Most radically “The
Unborn Son” pleads, “Later witnesses of outrage, we implore you to abort us” (237). Kraus’
intention is to show the horrors of war in the most shocking ways possible. There is no room for
humor here as there is with the abstract concepts of war such as patriotism and complicity.
Therefore, Zohn’s view that Kraus possessed an “ambivalent attitude” (38) does not bear out as
the book progresses. First, the Grumbler becomes increasingly biased and falls in line with
Kraus’ own views; second, the satire all but disappears as Kraus sees the war end (we remember
that he started writing during the war and continued writing new material throughout the war).
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The self-referentiality, from the Lusitania children to the use of submarines, overwhelms the
final passages of the satire. Kraus is not ambivalent in The Last Days of Mankind; rather he is
immersed in his vision; he is a proponent of total satire, which seeks to critique as decisively and
unilaterally as possible. Perhaps this is a necessary part of World War I satire; the weight and
seriousness of the situation required art different in apocalyptic magnitude from anything offered
Rabelais. If anything, this decision to end satire in this way enforces the notion of locality being
satire’s dominant force. Kraus’ moral sensibilities force his hand. He must be apocalyptic; he
must end with “The Unborn Son” declaring, “Here the air is noxious foul” (237) and with the
forsaken stage directions, “The glow dies out. Total darkness. Then, on the horizon, the wall of
flames leaps high. Death cries off stage.” (237), because that is the reality of the First World
War.

Beerbohm’s Institutional Satire
What, then, would Bakhtin make of Beerbohm? In Bakhtinian terms, Beerbohm can be
seen as the antithesis of Kraus. Instead of being overly negative and apocalyptic, he is perhaps
guilty of being too light-hearted (mass suicides aside) and not idealistic. Consequentially, his
laughter similarly lacks regenerative power because of his lack of idealism; Beerbohm largely
conforms to the Oxford ideal with little evidence of carnivalesque. The controversy, or the
subversion, in Zuleika Dobson is comparatively minimal; an old Oxonian writes for old
Oxonians. Perhaps as a consequence, when reading Zuleika Dobson one does not feel hatred
towards Zuleika, or consider her a villainous character. Primarily, this is because of the
absurdities in the novel, the Duke’s pretentious actions such as dressing up like a medieval
knight to better express the purity of his romantic intent, and “because we perceive that the love
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Zuleika inspires is essentially narcissistic and has deep roots in the institution she has
overwhelmed” (Lodge 40). As we have seen Bakhtin describe, the carnivalesque remains
outside the realm of officialdom (Rabelais 73). But Beerbohm’s satire seems to be very much
embedded in Oxford; his satire can better be defined as an inside joke rather than an agitation of
experience. Of course, we can laugh at Beerbohm’s humor, for humor there certainly is, but
according to Bakhtinian doctrine there is little here of the carnivalesque. His satire does not seek
to unmask, there is no opening of eyes or instruction. Instead, as we delve deeper into the satire
we are left with mere abstractions, the herd mentality and the propensity for power structures.
Beerbohm creates a situation where those in the know can laugh at the foolish undergraduates of
Oxford, like his readership perhaps was. It is an institutionalized satire and therefore noncarnivalesque because it goes along with the humor of the institution rather than subverting it.
Thus, Zuleika is not a villain; she is a fixture in the Oxford structure of laughter.
Michael Murphy claims that in Zuleika Dobson the characters “are in love with the Idea
of Love” (303). Little of the interactions between the characters that seek love (the Duke,
Noaks, Zuleika and Katie) are actually concerned with love itself and, as Murphy points out,
there is a distinct lack of “healthy sexuality” (303). Thus, it is possible to link the romance in the
novel to power and the abstract once more—the characters in the novel are not interested in
actual love but rather chase the abstract notion of the “Idea of Love.” This is relatable to the
abstract concept of power because the characters are primarily concerned with themselves and
display little or no altruism. In Bakhtinian terms, the descent into abstract concepts once more
indicates the failure of modern satire. For Bakhtin, the image of “character” is a “sterile
image…offered by degenerate, petty realism” (Rabelais 53). The static nature of the character
and the inward looking nature of Beerbohm’s satire, both in terms of his character’s narcissism
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and the novel’s exclusivity to Oxford, prevents universal laughter and hence instructive satire,
from being read in the text. Zuleika, for example, does not want to be desired, “but enjoys and
exploits the fact that she is unutterably desirable; the would-be Lover must remain eternally the
youth of the Grecian urn” (Murphy 303). Through the Keatsian comparison, Murphy, like
Danson, hints at the combination of romance with Romance. On one hand, the men of Oxford
seek a modern, lustful notion of love, but simultaneously they espouse the medieval fantasy of
undying love that is only preserved through death. Death preserves; as that instant where
Zuleika loved the Duke is immortalized forever if the Duke dies with that memory. The Duke
dies with his love for Zuleika unspoiled and the wish that maybe as he dies Zuleika is overcome
with grief. In that instant her love for him would return and become immortalized in the moment
of his death. Beerbohm presents the competition between romance and Romance; on one hand
we have the desire for romance, and on the other hand, the desire to enhance the Romantic
tradition. But for Bakhtin, this removal from the festive satire of the medieval period is
characteristic of post-medieval and post-Renaissance satire. Comments by Murphy and Danson
that Zuleika Dobson is a distinctly Oxford competition between modern romance and
Romanticism, enable us to apply Bakhtin’s musings on the Romantic genre as pertaining to the
individual rather than belonging to all the people. Unlike the medieval folk culture that
“belonged to all the people, the Romantic genre acquired a private ‘chamber’ character…an
individual carnival marked by a vivid sense of isolation” (Rabelais 37). Zuleika’s character is of
this ilk. This is significant because a Bakhtinian reading would dictate that this modern,
Romantic version of satire is local rather than universal, individual rather than collective.
Beerbohm makes a mockery of the romantic competition and the characters in the novel
are at the centre of this mockery. Zuleika may ask, “what harm has unrequited love ever done?”
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(99)—indicating her oblivious and self-centred attitude to romance—at the same time as the
Duke claims that when she was in love with him, she looked “nobler, more spiritual” (99). In
this particular instance, Zuleika and the Duke represent each side of the romance versus
Romance competition that is prevalent throughout the novel. Zuleika characterizes romance and
the search for affection and the chance to admire a man, while the Duke is more Romantic and
liable to represent love as divinely induced but with potentially morbid consequences—the Duke
asks Zuleika, “You don’t believe in the love that corrodes, the love that ruins?” (100). Zuleika
can even be considered as rejecting her place as the woman in the medieval Romance—rejecting
the ideal that it must always be men who place women on the pedestal rather than vice versa.
Thus, romance can be described as “a recurring attraction” (Dupee 188). Dupee is talking about
romance in the form of traditional English pastoralism in the novel, “the moonlight, the floating
mist, the nodding lilacs and laburnums, the weedy bottom of the Isis” (Dupee 188). But his
observation can be extended to include the character’s actions and, in turn, Murphy’s premier
point, the Idea of Love. Both Romance and romance attract the characters, and this attraction
culminates in the power struggle to which all of Beerbohm’s characters, even Zuleika, are
subservient.
But the problem with this narcissistic struggle is the failure of modern satire. In
Bakhtinian terms there is the absence of laughter as a regenerative power. Bakhtin bemoans,
“But laughter was cut down to cold humor, irony, sarcasm. It ceased to be a joyful and
triumphant hilarity. Its positive regenerating power was reduced to a minimum” (Rabelais 38).
This criticism better fits Kraus’ texts than Beerbohm, for Zuleika Dobson never quite loses its
joyful tone. But, at points, it does feel that this tone is the only mechanism Beerbohm’s satire
has; often there is little substance behind the humor, no carnival spectacle to speak of.
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Therefore, though Beerbohm is ironic, the whole text is steeped in irony and fails to provide the
grotesque realism necessary for the rejuvenation of Oxford. For example, the Duke is enamored
by his own thoughts, “It was a fine thing to be a savior…He was glad that his death would be a
public service to the University” (105). The irony is palpable: the Duke tells himself he is a
protector of Oxford when he clearly is not, and, additionally, he will turn out to be its downfall.
Therefore, while we see a satire of narcissism, what Beerbohm does not prescribe is how to
counteract the problems in Oxford. Certainly, the mass suicides offer no form of rejuvenation.
This conclusively brings the text closer to Bakhtin’s dreaded Romanticism, and the book is
ultimately too heavily constructed in a romantic, Oxford background to offer any genuine
regenerative powers in Bakhtinian terms. Beerbohm is guilty of an absence of ameliorative
satire throughout the text and part of the reason for the lack of instruction is a byproduct of the
abstractions that are constructed in his satire and the inherent locality of his text.
The divine versus human aspect is also apparent in the satire of Beerbohm and is perhaps
the antimony that is most relatable to the abstract construct, power. For the majority, if not all of
the novel, Zuleika is regarded as divine. This, evidently, supports Bakhtin’s theory that modern
satire shows a worrying propensity for submitting to idealism rather than subverting the norm.
When the Duke and Zuleika head towards the river, for example, two masses of people, one
coming and one leaving, swarm around Zuleika and the Duke. Zuleika causes this incident
because the men of Oxford attempting to get “one glimpse of the divine Miss Dobson”
(Beerbohm 96). Yet at other times in the novel, Zuleika appears rather plain and rather human,
with Beerbohm describing her on two occasions as “not strictly beautiful” (9, 210). Indeed, the
first time Beerbohm describes her appearance, he does so in unflattering terms:
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Zuleika was not strictly beautiful. Her eyes were a trifle large, and their lashes longer
than they need have been. An anarchy of small curls was her chevelure, a dark upland of
misrule, every hair asserting its rights over a not discreditable brow. For the rest, her
features were not at all original (9)
The words and phrases that stand out here are “not discreditable” and “not at all original.”
Simply, Zuleika is attractive but she is not perfect and she is certainly not unique. There is no
sense of divinity derived from her looks alone; she is an ordinary, if striking, woman. The
laughter here is found in her unoriginality and, for the first time, Beerbohm heads towards the
carnivalesque and grotesque because of his subversion of the typecast. His satire is no longer
just a satire on humanly constructed abstracts such as the femme fatale, herd mentality, and
power relationships, where absurd situations consist of the only basis for satire and where irony
provides the only reason for laughter. The unoriginality of Zuleika is a technique comparably
grotesque; instead of a wildly attractive female with a persuasive, silver tongue, we encounter a
more ordinary looking woman, distinctly deficient of a charming personality.
Falling short of perfection is nothing new in romantic literature; Shakespeare most
famously wrote that “My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the sun; / Coral is far more red than her
lips’ red, / If snow be white, why then her breast are dun” (130. 1-3). But the lack of originality
that Zuleika possesses perhaps is imperfection. Beerbohm satirizes her lack of originality by
literally claiming that her bodily features have been borrowed, stolen or bought from other
beautiful women—“from Madame la Marquise de Saint-Ouen came the shapely tilt of the nose.
The mouth was a mere replica of cupid’s bow…no apple tree, no wall of peaches, had not been
robbed, nor any Tyrian rose-garden, for the glory of Miss Dobson’s cheeks. Her neck was
imitation-marble” (10). God has not divinely created her nor, conversely, is she a flawless
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devilish creation that deceitfully appears as something close to perfection, in the fashion, say,
that Goethe’s Mephistopheles makes Gretchen appear to Faust. F.W. Dupee called this “comic
literalization” and said that “in Zuleika Dobson the same mechanism is flagrantly at work and the
victims are many” (183). Beerbohm’s comic literalization is to create an unoriginal character
that is rooted in this unoriginality, in spite of the opinion of others, and her own, that consider
Zuleika to be so divine she is worth dying for. But, in this instance, Beerbohm offers more than
merely comic literalization. He conceives the subverted idea of a completely unoriginal femme
fatale among a completely unoriginal crowd, in a completely unoriginal town. Primarily because
of this, he moves away from the modern, idealistic spirit and towards the original carnival
because of the suspension of hierarchy (all men are Zuleika’s victims) and the subversion of the
qualities of a lead character.
Furthermore, her unoriginality is so imitative that it can be similarly be copied and used
by other people. Her mistress, Melisande, while not possessing the same powers of attraction as
Zuleika and despite being a “plain looking woman” (Beerbohm 210), enjoys many of the same
characteristics as Zuleika—“the poise of her head, the boldness of her regard and brilliance of
her smile, the leisurely and swinging way in which she walked, with a hand on the hip—all these
of hers were Zuleika’s” (210). So why does Zuleika, a woman who makes men kill themselves,
fall so short of uniqueness? Perhaps there is another level of satire at work here. Beerbohm is
satirizing the epic novel in general for its portrayal of the woman as something either perfect,
unique or both. But he is also satirizing the human nature, of the Oxford undergraduates
specifically, to create this abstraction when an impartial party (a narrator, say, who is touched by
the divine) can clearly see that she is not deific. For, in the biased and subjective eyes of humans
(who are not divine), in the right light, anyone and anything can be celestial, even the hapless
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Noaks, who, in a moment of weakness, Zuleika describes as “divine” (325). Beerbohm “plays
with paradox” (Lodge 40) because as much as Zuleika reeks of unoriginality, she is utterly
irresistible. This is the ambivalence that Bakhtin laments the loss of in modern culture. Bakhtin
states, “In the new official culture there prevails a tendency toward the stability and completion
of being, toward one single meaning, one single tone of seriousness. The ambivalence of the
grotesque can no longer be admitted” (Rabelais 101). But like the scene involving the mental
patient in The Last Days of Mankind, the imitativeness of Zuleika’s character and appearance
provides the ambivalent laughter for which Bakhtin longs.
Therefore, in both The Last Days of Mankind and Zuleika Dobson include elements that
underscore Bakhtin’s doctrine because they are modern texts that relate to the carnivalesque, a
point Linda Hutcheon supports, “there are close links between what he (Bakhtin) called
carnivalesque parody and the authorized transgression of parodic texts today” (26). However,
though there are elements and sections of each text that relates to carnivalesque, the majority of
each text is not carnivalesque. Both fall foul to the abstractive qualities that Bakhtin is quick to
loathe because the abstract does not allow the text to regenerate positively. This happens for
different reasons in the two texts; Beerbohm’s is too lightheartedly local and contingent on the
Oxford he knows and consequently lowers the potential for universality and increasing the
potential for abstractions. Kraus’ suffers the same end but by different means. His play becomes
too serious and less satirical than straightforward, conservative criticism. As a result, the
abstract is all that remains of what Bakhtin dictates on modern satire.
However, is it a distinct concern of the reader and critic that we are left with just
abstractions? Chapter II argued that these abstractive qualities were the only elements of satire
that were potentially transferable to other cultures precisely because they do not rely on
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contingencies. In contrast, Bakhtin sees these abstractions as a sad byproduct of modern satire
because they do not possess the ability to positively instruct. This is where Bakhtin’s argument
falters. By these abstractive elements, we can learn more about the follies of human nature
(without ever quite perhaps, becoming universal), something that is not possible if we are left
with a commentary on local contingencies (World War I, Oxford in 1911). Though satire may
not possess the positive ameliorative qualities that defined it in the Middle Ages, the
carnivalesque can still be manipulated (mental patient, unoriginality of Zuleika) to instruct the
reader, even if the instruction arises from negative literature. Because of the ability of
abstraction to overcome locale and period we witness universality (and, hence, the tenuous
possibility of instruction) without being positive. If most of the satire in these two texts is
contingently local (and this is where most of what is the humorous portion resides), then the less
humorous and more universal abstractions function together with inherent locality to produce the
satire. Both satires in Bakhtinian terms are not perfect, but the abstractions found in each should
not be considered as degenerative as Bakhtin would treat them.
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Conclusion
In 1957, Alvin B. Kernan said that the preeminent satire is the satire that is solidified “by
a firm, definite understanding of the moral issues involved” (The Cankered Muse 88-89). Just
two years beforehand, Northrop Frye stated that the Juvenalian view of satire is defined by “an
interest in anything men do” (229). Evidently, there are many more layers to satire than this, but,
by combining Kernan’s and Frye’s observations, satire can be viewed as a literary topic that
focuses on the moral actions of humanity. In contrast, in a recent (2007) study of satire, Charles
A. Knight provides another observation concerning satire, “satire is independent of moral
purpose. Its purpose…is perception rather than changed behaviour, although change in
behaviour may well result from change in perception” (5). Knight continues, “but if it insists on
such (moral) values, it must give them enough force to encourage readers to transfer them
beyond the text” (5). Knight appears to contradict himself in the first quoted passage or, at the
very least, express that despite the absence of ameliorative purpose in satire, to ameliorate is a
potential byproduct of satire. But common themes in satirical texts should not be confused with
true universality in satire. Satire, Knight claims, is universal not in its instruction but in its
inquiry and provocation (5). This is significant because, although Knight agrees that satire
cannot universally instruct, it potentially contradicts the idea that a local base permits satire. As
we have seen in both Kraus and Beerbohm, there is a distinct moral purpose on the author’s
behalf, even if, and this point now contradicts Knight’s second quoted passage, these morals do
not extend beyond the boundaries of locality and topicality.
Nevertheless, Knight’s second point is relevant because it relates to the universality of
satire. Knight suggests that to involve morals and values in a satirical text is to by necessity to
enter the satire in a mode that can span time and space. For example, in The Last Days of

Mankind, Kraus presents a crucial contradiction relating to the virtues of fighting for one’s
country and the perception of what it means to be honorable, heroic, and to die for one’s country,
GRUMBLER: The fatherland considers the opportunity of dying for the fatherland a
punishment, the most severe punishment to boot. The citizen thinks of it as the highest
honor. He wants to die a hero’s death. He wants to enlist, but he is enlisted instead (96)
The suggestion of confused morals is the object of satire here. It is honorable to die for one’s
country but simultaneously the punishment for being radically unpatriotic is to die for one’s
country. The satire works against the perception of morality here, just as Swift presents
Gulliver’s confused morality in Book IV of Gulliver’s Travels, but to say that satire is therefore
independent of moral purpose, as Knight does, is incorrect. The role of satire in this example is
to redefine the morals of the Austrian people and show the conflicting nature of human values.
Furthermore, the moral component of satire can assume a universal quality. The quoted
excerpt above preempts Joseph Heller’s war satire, and Kraus’ scene eerily resonates Heller’s
now famous phrase, “Catch-22.” Heller explains the meaning of the phrase in Catch-22:
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one’s
own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a
rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as
soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr
would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t; but if he was sane he had to fly
them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was
sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this
clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle (46)
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Anyone who wants to get out of combat duty is not crazy, but you have to be crazy to participate
in combat duty. This is comparable to Kraus’ own catch: to fight and die for the fatherland is the
greatest honor; those who refuse to fight and die for the fatherland are without honor and are
punished by being forced to fight and die for the fatherland. The mere fact that both Kraus and
Heller explain the futility of the common man in war, hints at the universality of this segment of
each text. However, crucially, these “catches” do not instruct, they merely perceive. There is no
way out of these cyclical clauses, no remedy provided in the satire. The clauses remain abstract
because of the absence of a solution for humanity. They are not definitive truths that humans can
rely on or prescribe. The two “catches” are a product of circumstantial creation that happens to
apply to other situations but not as a truth, simply as an insight into the folly of human nature.
This once again indicates that the abstract elements perceived by the satirist are the most easily
transferable elements of satirical texts.
Perhaps, then, this points once more to the significance of heritage in satire. Both Heller
and Kraus relied on these circumstantial wars that were incidentally the only two truly global
wars in human history. Only through their perception of humanity’s propensity for the
theoretical (in this case, morals) over any necessary truths does the satire begin to branch out
from its birthplace. This locality is particularly felt in Beerbohm’s satire on Oxford, yet there are
instances of satirical texts displaying even more bias to their locale than Beerbohm. In a variety
of small shtetl’s (the Yiddish word for a small town with a large population of, often piously
Orthodox, Jews) centred in Zamosc, in far eastern Poland, we can observe the true locality of
satire. Isaac Leib Peretz, better known as I.L. Peretz, was a Jewish writer who wrote in nearly
exclusively in Yiddish towards the turn of the century. Ruth R. Wisse describes him as
“arguably the most important figure in the development of modern Jewish culture” with an
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estimated hundred thousand people accompanying his remains to the Warsaw cemetery (xiii).
Peretz is a writer, if there ever was, that epitomizes the exclusivity of a writer; the language and
era he wrote in permitted only the Yiddish speaking areas of Poland, and especially those who
had experienced Shtetl’s, to read, let alone understand, his works. The text under investigation is
Bilder fun a Provints-Rayze (Impressions of a Journey through the Tomaszow Region) that was
set in 1890 and published in 1904. It features a narrator whom Wisse describes as being “very
much like (Peretz) himself” (xviii). The narrator has been hired to compile statistics in attempt
to disprove anti-Semitic allegations of Jewish parasitism and draft evasion (Peretz 19). But this
is not the object of satire. The object of satire is turned not against the inhabitants of the shtetl,
its extreme poverty, “he succeeds with great difficulty in eking out enough to feed wife and
children” (Peretz 52), dearth of pleasure in the society, and the questionable desirability of living
in the shtetl, “Jew, 82 years old; swollen feet; household of 17” (Peretz 64). Instead the satire is
turned against “the narrator’s efforts to measure the shtetl’s poverty in statistical, scientific
terms” (Caplan 76). The narrator, rather than bringing the shtetl into the twentieth century is
himself brought backwards,
What will be the upshot of the statistics? Will statistics tell us how much suffering is
needed—empty bellies and unused teeth; hunger so intense that the sight of a dry crust of
bread will make the eyes bulge in their sockets, as if drawn out by pliers; indeed actual
death by starvation—to produce an unlicensed gin mill, a burglar, a horse thief? (Peretz
60)
Thus, the narrator’s tentativeness becomes our own (Caplan 85). The satire is directed at the
reader who is inevitably the outsider. Furthermore, in relation to the locality of satire, Peretz’s
indebtedness to a very particular culture that has little contact with the modernized, outside
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world provides an analogous situation for the reader. In Beerbohm’s and Kraus’ texts we are
outsiders. But in Peretz’s satire, the extreme locality of his text means the reader becomes the
object of satire precisely because he is an outsider. In this sense, because Peretz has made the
narrator analogous to the majority of readers, both are outsiders; we witness an underlying level
of satire that satirizes the fact that locality is so vital to satire that the reader himself is
consequently always destined to be an outsider. This is never quite felt to the same extent in
either The Last Days of Mankind or Zuleika Dobson because the reader feels more included in
the text. In Beerbohm, the reader is most likely himself an Oxford man, and his elitism permits
him to feel included in the text. In Kraus, the views of the Grumbler are the opinion with which
the reader is supposed to identify. But the important article is that the reader is still on the
outside looking into the self-referential drama. If the satire is based in a particular locality, then
the non-contemporary reader is always an outsider; in Peretz this is merely extended to include
the reader in the story as the narrator and making him part of the art form. In Peretz we are truly
treading the borderline between art and life, “Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they
live in it, and everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people” (Bakhtin 7).
Despite Bakhtin’s claim that modern satire is not universal because it is too negative,
there are identifiable elements in both Kraus’ and Beerbohm’s texts that relate to carnivalesque.
They are not the overwhelming foundation of the book but several passages (the mental patient
acting as the Shakespearean “fool,” the unoriginality of the femme fatale, and even the mass
suicides in Zuleika Dobson) show elements of the grotesque, and constitute a purer,
unadulterated satire removed from modern formalism. But these are not the primary functions of
the two respective satires, and only go a short distance to proving the universality of satire.
What is perhaps more pertinent here is the abstract qualities of satire that persist in both texts and
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whether or not we can consider them universal. Bakhtin describes the power of grotesque
imagery over abstract ideas:
The abstract idea distorts this nature (positivity) of the grotesque image. It transforms the
center of gravity to a “moral” meaning. Moreover it submits the substratum of the image
to the negative element. Exaggeration becomes a caricature…But here (in Rabelais’
writings) disintegration is still at its early stage. The grotesque images selected to serve
an abstract idea are still too powerful; they preserve their nature and pursue their own
logic, independently from the author’s intentions, and sometimes contrary to them
(Rabelais 62-63)
As discussed in Chapter II, the abstractions are very powerful in both texts and often become the
dominant vehicle of satire. Indeed, they are so dominant that it was posited that they are perhaps
responsible for the only universal qualities of Kraus’ and Beerbohm’s satire. Bakhtin disagrees
with the universality of abstract ideas—they make the satire “moral,” which, in turn, makes it at
once local and negative. Bakhtin claims that carnivalesque laughter is universal because
everyone is included in the satire (Rabelais 11), something that does not hold for the satires of
Kraus and Beerbohm that are heavily reliant on their locale and period. However, it is also
possible to see morality through a universal lens and consider the abstractions that are satirized
or otherwise attacked as somewhat transferable across time and location.
The moral issues that Kraus discusses are namely complicity, the state of German culture,
and nationalism. In Zuleika Dobson, the primary objects of satire are the femme fatale, power
structures, and the herd mentality. These are all universal abstractions (again, they are defined as
abstractions because, although they can be measured in some form, they are not objects but
purely a creation of human thought). The real question then concerns not their applicability to
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other situations; despite their basis in locality, these are properties that are perhaps transitive.
Instead, the question is whether these abstractions such as the warnings against nationalism and
the degradation of culture can universally instruct the reader to be aware of or potentially avoid
similar situations in the future. Can we or should we learn from this laughter? Dustin Griffin
certainly thinks so, “Most satire, at least since the Renaissance, is polemical, ranging itself
against some previous practice and attempting to displace it” (6). Beerbohm’s satire is less
polemical than Kraus’ because he prescribes to the reader a caricatured Oxford in playful terms.
If Kraus’ satire is polemical, which it almost certainly is, then the practices he attacks are the role
of the press and nationalism in war. Bakhtin almost directly disagrees with Griffin, claiming,
“the carnival is far distant from the negative and formal parody of modern times. Folk humor
denies, but it revives and renews at the same time” (Rabelais 11). Griffin suggests the opposite,
that modern satire displaces the old with a new system of morals and abstractions. But folk
humor, says Bakhtin, relies on no such certainties, and is hence far more important than modern
satire, because it relies on “regenerating ambivalence” (Rabelais 21). It is less polemical on the
author’s behalf, but more of a presentation of the unmasking of human truths through the
grotesque.
However, this is not to say that modern abstractions are necessarily coarse as Bakhtin
wishes his readers to believe. If the abstractions themselves are critical of human nature and
highlight our faults then we can react to this criticism. For example, following the herd, a major
abstraction that characters blindly obey in both texts, is easily remedied. Admittedly, these
abstractions must, as Bakhtin prescribes, be based in locality because of the moral nature of their
birth, but this does not mean that there can sometimes be common elements drawn out of these
abstractions.

	
  

115	
  

Thus, through the satirical texts of Beerbohm and Kraus we witness the potential for
universality that satire must reach towards. A truly universal satire may be impossible, but the
abstract elements form the basis of transferable elements of satire. These abstractions are
themselves satirized and because they rely less on the circumstances of the location and period
that the author is writing in, they therefore pertain to the universal. Without them, the text may
fall in to the trap of being purely incidental. But the most important and necessary aspect of
satire still appears to be situational. Every satirical text must have a local foundation that it
constantly refers back to. The heritage will not only drive the plot but, more significantly, also
provide the grounds for the author to begin his scathing attack and subsequently impart the
correct morals to the reader (even if these morals are not common enough to be deemed
universal). Satire is, as Hutcheon determined, self-referential (85). Walter Benjamin deliberates
on Kraus’ motives, “Is he lamenting, chastising, or rejoicing? No matter—on this evanescent
voice the ephemeral work of Kraus is modeled” (273). Satire metaphorically lives and dies in a
day. So, while satire can be universal in its scope, any universality is born out of its locality and
the transferable elements can only begin to thrive after the self-referentiality has been
established.
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